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INTRODUCTION
Fan fiction and remix culture have been and are continuing to 
explode both in terms of social relevance and sheer quantity of new 
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versity of Chicago, M.A.; University of Illinois at Chicago, Ph.D.).  I would like to grate-
fully acknowledge the research and administrative assistance of Casey Fiesler, Pam Hol-
land, and Nicole Lytle, as well as the staff of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.  I 
would also like to thank the Symposium participants for their many helpful comments.     
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works produced and available.1  Fan fiction is simply that:  fiction cre-
ated by fans, typically of popular commercial works, such as the Harry 
Potter book and film series.  Rebecca Tushnet’s path-setting article de-
fines fan fiction as follows:  “‘Fan Fiction,’ broadly speaking, is any 
kind of written creativity that is based on an identifiable segment of 
popular culture, such as a television show, and is not produced as 
‘professional’ writing.”2
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. could be called the first fan-
fiction case, but Alice Randall, the author of the parody at issue in 
Suntrust, is better described as an antifan of Gone with the Wind.3  The 
case turned on a defense of criticism and parody, not specifically on 
the fanlike nature of the work.4  However, if Randall’s book counts as 
fan fiction, then it is not the case that there is no settled fan-fiction 
case law, a claim that sometimes has been made.5
As technology has advanced, fan fiction has evolved into “fan-
works” or, alternatively, “fanvids.”6  A related but more general term is 
1 See Matthew Mirapaul, Why Just Listen to Pop When You Can Mix Your Own?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at E2 (“In postmodern culture, in which existing elements are 
routinely cut, pasted and blended into new works, computers are providing handy 
tools for these transformations, and the Internet is supplying an eager audience for the 
results.”).  Like amateur musicians who produce derivative musical works, amateur au-
thors maintain hundreds of literary “fan fiction” websites publishing stories about 
popular characters from television shows like Star Trek and The West Wing. Id.
2 Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions:  Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 
LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651, 655 (1997) [hereinafter Tushnet, Legal Fictions].
3 Tushnet’s definition does not mention that the works must be created by fans.  
Thus, the definition would not exclude the work of antifans such as Alice Randall.  
Randall is the author of The Wind Done Gone, a brilliantly scathing critique of the racism 
embedded in Gone with the Wind. See generally Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 
268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that Randall was entitled to a fair use 
defense for The Wind Done Gone and lifting the injunction issued against its publica-
tion); ALICE RANDALL, THE WIND DONE GONE (2001). 
4 See Suntrust, 268 F.3d at 1267-76 (analyzing Randall’s fair use defense in terms of 
parody). 
5 See, e.g., HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE 188 (2006) [hereinafter JEN-
KINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE] (“After several decades of aggressive studio attention, 
there is literally no case law concerning fan fiction.”); Meredith McCardle, Note, Fan 
Fiction, Fandom, and Fanfare: What’s All the Fuss?, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 433, 441 
(2003) (“[N]ot a single fan fiction case has appeared on a court docket, although this 
distinct absence of litigation may not continue indefinitely.”).  Tushnet herself made 
this claim prior to the decision in Suntrust. See Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 
664 (“Case law does not address fair use in the context of fan fiction or anything rea-
sonably similar to it.”). 
6 Media scholar Henry Jenkins refers to “fan videos” in his early discussion of the 
subject, though the shortened version, “fanvids,” is more common now.  See HENRY 
JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS ch. 7 (1992) [hereinafter JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS]
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“remix.”  The term “remix” avoids the suggestion that the new works 
are produced by fans of the underlying works.  Lawrence Lessig gives 
examples of remix works that are highly critical of the works drawn 
upon in the remix.7  Lessig does not define the term “remix” in his 
new book, despite its title.  He does, however, note that remix works 
are “transformative.”8  He also equates remix with literary quotation.9
There is a tension here, however, as a work is not necessarily trans-
formed simply by adding a quotation from another work.10  Addition-
ally, there is ambiguity because Lessig is not explicit as to whether he 
intends to use the term “transformative” in its legal sense, namely, in 
reference to factor one of the fair use test.11  The question is pertinent 
as there is a movement to develop the concept of transformative use 
that appears not to limit itself to the legal sense of this word.12  The 
(devoting a chapter to “Fan Music Video and the Poetics of Poaching”); see also Posting 
of Henry Jenkins to Confessions of an Aca-Fan, How To Watch a Fan-Vid, 
http://www.henryjenkins.org/2006/09/how_to_watch_a_fanvid.html (Sept. 18, 2006) 
(examining fan videos posted online, including Star Trek videos set to Nine Inch Nails 
music). See generally Sarah Trombley, Visions and Revisions:  Fanvids and Fair Use, 25 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 647, 650-55 (2007) (discussing the history of fanvids on the 
Internet).
7 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX 72-74 (2008) [hereinafter LESSIG, REMIX] (provid-
ing an example of remixed sound bites from George W. Bush and Tony Blair meant to 
be highly critical). 
8 Id. at 255. 
9 See id. at 51 (“Ben’s [Lessig’s friend’s] writing had a certain style. . . . Were it digi-
tal, we’d call it remix. . . . [H]e built the argument by clipping quotes from the authors 
he was discussing.”); see also id. at 69 (“[Read/Write media] remix, or quote, a wide 
range of ‘texts’ to produce something new.”). 
10 See Pierre N. Leval, Commentary, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1112-16 (1990) (discussing the existence of literary quotation insufficiently trans-
formative to warrant fair use protection). 
11 Factor one of the fair use test is helpfully described in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu-
sic, Inc.:
 The first factor in a fair use enquiry is the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit edu-
cational purposes. . . . The central purpose of this investigation is to see, in 
Justice Story’s words, whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” 
of the original creation . . . or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, mean-
ing, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the new 
work is “transformative.” 
510 U.S. 569, 578-79 (1994) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
12 See Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent:  Transformation in Practice, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 497, 501 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent]
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definitional expansion of the term “transformative use” beyond its le-
gal origins would complement Lessig’s larger agenda, which includes 
bypassing fair use altogether when it comes to the legal treatment of 
amateur remix.13
Broadly, then, remix works are created by taking digital snippets 
from various sources and combining them to create a new work.14  A 
nondigital precursor in the visual arts, collage, traces back to the be-
ginning of modern art with the works of Braque and Picasso in the 
early years of the Twentieth Century.15  A term roughly synonymous 
with remix frequently used in a musical context is “mashup,” which 
“[t]ypically consist[s] of a vocal track from one song digitally super-
imposed on the instrumental track of another.”16  Another roughly 
synonymous term is “appropriation art.”  The best-known contempo-
rary appropriation artist—especially to copyright scholars—is Jeff 
Koons.17
Remix is legally interesting.  Infringement is a central issue be-
cause much remix contains varying amounts of unauthorized copy-
right-protected material.  There is a strong argument, however, that 
much of this remix is fair use and hence legal.  Because the trend to-
ward remix is substantially technology driven, it is likely to continue, if 
not to accelerate, unless the law somehow puts the brakes on the 
process.  Both the potential for explosive new growth and the poten-
(discussing a new nonprofit Organization for Transformative Works as a vehicle to 
study the transformative creative practices of various creative communities). 
13 See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 254 (“[W]e need to restore a copyright law 
that leaves ‘amateur creativity’ free from regulation.”); see also Christina Z. Ranon, 
Note, Honor Among Thieves:  Copyright Infringement in Internet Fandom, 8 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 421, 451 (2006) (“The best way to protect this useful, transformative category 
of creative works is through a categorical fair use exception for Internet fan fiction.”). 
14 The term “remix culture” has been used to mean “a society which allows and 
encourages derivative works.”  Remix Syndicate, Written, http://remixsyndicate. 
wordpress.com/written (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).  A related term Lessig has used 
previously is “cut and paste” creativity.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 105 (2004). 
15 Tate Collection, Glossary:  Collage, http://www.tate.org.uk/collections/ 
glossary/definition.jsp?entryId=70 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); Diane Waldman, Gug-
genheim Collection—Concept—Collage, http://www.guggenheimcollection.org/site/ 
concept_Collage.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009); cf. Negativland, Two Relationships to a 
Cultural Public Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 239, 255-56 
(2003) (“Copyright law, as presently interpreted and enforced with regard to collage, is 
being used by cultural property owners as anti-art law . . . .”). 
16 Pete Rojas, Bootleg Culture, SALON, Aug. 1, 2002, http://archive.salon.com/ 
tech/feature/2002/08/01/bootlegs. 
17 See, e.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that 
Koons’s incorporation of a photograph into a collage painting constituted fair use). 
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tial for its curtailment make the task of determining how best to regu-
late these important new kinds of creative works urgent.  The remain-
der of this Article will develop such an account. 
Below, I will first develop a positive account, which will make clear 
the important role that social norms have played in the de facto regu-
lation of fan-fiction and remix works up to this point.  I use the term 
“de facto” as a term of art to embrace regulation both by formal legal 
means and by informal social norms.18  Understanding this story is as 
important as it is instructive in terms of demonstrating possible alter-
natives to regulation.  This account, of course, says nothing about the 
normative desirability of the current role played by social norms.  
Since social norms have sometimes served as regulators in the absence 
or ineffectiveness of formal law, only to be replaced at some later time 
by more formal forms of regulation, it is especially pertinent to ask 
whether such informal regulatory means may be better formalized. 
In general, recent norms theory serves to correct earlier optimism 
about the power of norms to regulate judiciously as a result of their 
emergence from bottom-up social forces that democratically take into 
account the desires and preferences of everyday members of society.19
This romantic conception has been replaced by a contemporary one 
under which social norms are better understood as potentially subject 
to their own distorting influences.  Therefore, like formal law, each 
social norm must be normatively justified on its own merits instead of 
its pedigree.20  This said, it is also true that recent norms theory has 
shown that social norms are often the most effective means of regula-
tion.  When the discussion below turns to policy alternatives, I will not 
only defend the desirability of the role currently played by norms in 
18 See generally STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (2004) [hereinafter 
HETCHER, NORMS] (developing a philosophical conception of norms and applying it 
to tort law). 
19 See, e.g., Alex Geisinger, Are Norms Efficient?  Pluralistic Ignorance, Heuristics, and 
the Use of Norms as Private Regulation, 57 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9-15 (2005) (describing the evo-
lutionary model of norms with an emphasis on the work of Ellickson and Axelrod and 
discussing potential problems with this model). 
20 See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982) (discussing the false 
assumption that a group of people with a common interest will act to further that in-
terest).  Jennifer Rothman has published an intriguing discussion questioning the mer-
its of norms (also known as customs) in an intellectual property context.  See Jennifer 
E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899, 
1972 (2007) (“While some scholars have suggested preferring IP users to owners, I see 
no reason to favor one-sided customs regardless of which side is preferred.  Practices 
developed solely by users are likely to be just as bad at balancing IP rights as those de-
veloped solely by owners.” (footnote omitted)). 
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regulating fan-fiction and remix works but will also argue that norms 
offer the potential to play an even more valuable and significant role. 
It will be helpful to begin by looking in greater detail at the main 
social norms that play a regulatory role.  To a certain extent, the 
norms discussed in the next Part emerged under a somewhat different 
set of conditions than exist today or are likely to exist in the future, as 
technological advances make it easier for fanworks and remix to draw 
much more comprehensively from underlying sources.  These ad-
vances may dramatically increase the amount and source variety of 
remix while simultaneously reducing the role that communities have 
played in the fan-fiction world.  Thus, one of the important questions 
that we will need to keep in mind is whether norms can continue to 
play the important role that they have played in past regulation of fan 
fiction.  Once we see how the relevant norms function, we will be in a 
better position to appreciate how norms working with the fair use doc-
trine and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)21 together 
provide a regulatory environment in which remix can continue to 
flourish, while allowing owners to protect against those uses that they 
perceive as especially costly. 
I. THREE NORMS THAT REGULATE FAN FICTION AND REMIX CULTURE
The following discussion sets out three distinct social norms that 
play a substantial role in the overall regulation of fan fiction and re-
mix culture.  The first two of these are well established.  The third is 
battling with its antithesis for dominance.22  Lawyers sometimes over-
emphasize the role of law in the overall regulation of society; it is as if 
law makes rules from on high and people below are pulled by strings, 
like puppets buffeted about by the incentives created by law.23  Con-
21 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
22 These are not the only norms at work.  For example, one important norm in the 
fan-fiction community requires fans to give attribution to their sources.  See Rebecca 
Tushnet, Payment in Credit:  Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 2007, at 135, 155-60 [hereinafter Tushnet, Payment in Credit] (discussing 
the norms surrounding credit and attribution in fan fiction); see also Casey Fiesler, 
Note, Everything I Need To Know I Learned from Fandom:  How Existing Social Norms Can 
Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 729, 
752 (2008) (noting two situations in fandom where attribution is considered impor-
tant).
23 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 137-42 (1991) (criticizing the 
traditional Hobbesian framework of legal centralism adopted by contemporary law and 
economics scholars, which regards the state as the sole source of social order and de-
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trary to this top-down causal view, one of the contributions of norms 
theory to the law has been to help foster a better appreciation of the 
fact that the regulatory structure of society is constructed from the 
bottom up as well.24  Indeed, these forces interact in ways that causally 
loop.  Not only do norms regulate human activities in an informal, 
nonlegal manner, but norms and law influence one another and work 
in tandem to regulate behavior.25  In the absence of law, or of effective 
law, norms will tend to fill in the void.26  This has been poignantly evi-
denced by the phenomenon of file sharing.  Initially, the law was in 
dispute, with one influential element of the policy community arguing 
that the activity was fair use.27  This defense was no longer colorable 
after Napster and was not raised in Grokster.28  In the early days of file 
sharing, most people were simply unaware of the legal status of their 
nies the role of substantive norms in guiding behavior).  Other scholars agree with 
Professor Ellickson’s argument that legal theory consistently overemphasizes the role 
of law.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Le-
gitimate and Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1123, 1126 (1997) (“Over a very 
wide range of human interaction, the content of the relevant legal rules simply does 
not matter very much.  People do not bother to learn the underlying legal rules that 
affect their actions and rely instead on norms and customs to govern their behavior.”). 
24 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 23, at 141-42 (discussing the important role 
played by norms in regulating property entitlements in the Old West in the absence of 
an effective legal regime); HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 18, at 243 (discussing the role 
of norms in the early regulation of website privacy given the relative absence of formal 
rules).
25 See ELLICKSON, supra note 23, at 132 (“When courts look to business custom to 
flesh out incomplete express contracts, the state is enforcing norms created by social 
forces.  A person who has ‘internalized’ a social norm is by definition committed to 
self-enforcement of a rule of the informal-control system.” (footnote omitted)). 
26 As the title of Ellickson’s book suggests, the absence of law does not lead to dis-
order but to an order established by suitable social norms.  Id. at 4-6. 
27 See, e.g., CHRIS WOODFORD, 2 THE INTERNET: A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 33 
(Hilary W. Poole ed., 2005) (“[A]dvocacy groups such as EFF and Public Knowledge 
counter [the arguments of copyright owners] that consumers are seeing their rights 
systematically eroded by new copyright laws, antipiracy technologies that seek to pre-
vent what many people see as fair use, and deliberately intimidating legal actions by 
such organizations as the RIAA and the MPAA.”); see also The O’Reilly Factor (Fox News 
television broadcast July 21, 2000) (transcript available at LexisNexis, News Library, 
Transcript No. 072103cb.256) (facilitating a debate between John Perry Barlow of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation and Howard King, the attorney for Metallica in the 
Napster lawsuit, over the potential application of fair use to file sharing). 
28 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37 
(2005) (holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use 
for copyright infringement becomes liable for the infringements of its users); see also
Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that injunctive relief is appropriate in cases involving piracy but not when the alleged 
infringer has a potential fair use defense). 
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behavior.29  The commercial creative-content industry expended sig-
nificant effort to educate people on the illegality and purported 
wrongfulness of file sharing, comparing it to theft.30  Perhaps to the 
industry’s surprise, its efforts at convincing people that their actions 
were equivalent to thievery have had a limited effect.  Ordinary moral-
ity appears not to find the analogy compelling.31  While the law in a 
typical file-sharing case is no longer in dispute, the activity continues 
apace, occurring millions of times per day.32  The best explanation of 
this behavior, then, is not the legal status of the activity; rather it draws 
centrally on social norms.33
It is against this background that one can best understand the 
current situation with fan fiction and remix culture.  With file sharing, 
29 See Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement:  The Case Against 
Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1142 (2005) (“Many users of file-sharing net-
works were unaware of copyright issues until the first wave of litigation.”).  File sharing 
has enough in common with sharing CDs among friends—and is different enough 
from selling pirated CDs—that users of file-sharing technology might believe that file 
sharing is not a priori illegal and that it may be justifiable until a court or statute ex-
plicitly states otherwise.  This was the case in the initial years of Napster. 
30 See Steven A. Hetcher, The Music Industry’s Failed Attempt To Influence File Sharing 
Norms, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 10, 11 (2004) [hereinafter Hetcher, Music Industry]
(“[Groups such as the RIAA, MPAA, and AAP] have sought to teach consumers that 
file sharing is not permissible behavior but is instead tantamount to stealing and there-
fore morally wrong in the same way that stealing is morally wrong.”); see also Raymond 
Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright:  Napster and the New Economics of Digital 
Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264-65 (2002) (describing the “copyright optimists,” 
who regard file sharing as “nothing more than theft”). 
31 See, e.g., AMANDA LENHART & SUSANNAH FOX, THE PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN 
LIFE PROJECT, DOWNLOADING FREE MUSIC: INTERNET MUSIC LOVERS DON’T THINK IT’S
STEALING 5-6 (2000), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/ 
Reports/2000/PIP_Online_Music_Report2.pdf.pdf (finding that seventy-eight percent 
of music downloaders and fifty-three percent of all Internet users do not consider file 
sharing stealing). 
32 See, e.g., Stan J. Liebowitz, File Sharing:  Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruc-
tion?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 (2006) (“At the high end, there are claims that up to 
60 million Americans have used peer-to-peer networks, that perhaps as many as 5 bil-
lion music files are downloaded by Americans in a typical month . . . and that perhaps 
60 percent or more of all Internet bandwidth is taken up by file sharing . . . .” (citation 
omitted) (footnotes omitted)); Brian Stelter & Brad Stone, Digital Pirates Winning Battle 
with Major Hollywood Studios, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A1 (noting that over seven mil-
lion copies of the recent Batman film were illegally downloaded from file-sharing sites). 
33 See Hetcher, Music Industry, supra note 27; see also Gaia Bernstein, When New 
Technologies Are Still New:  Windows of Opportunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV.
921, 944 (2006) (“Dominant social norms do not conceive of file sharing as immoral 
conduct and it appears that copyright violations are not embedded with social stigma.  
Hence, peer-to-peer file sharing remains an extensive practice despite legal action.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
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the law was clear.  What stood in the way of bringing about behavior in 
conformity with the law were (1) that file sharers had to be educated 
about the law and (2) that once file sharers were educated, they re-
mained shaped more by norms permitting such behavior than by 
norms proffered by the music industry proscribing it.  With fan fiction 
and remix, the law is more uncertain and nuanced.  Of most dramatic 
significance is the fact that while file sharing typically is not fair use, 
typical amateur fan fiction and remix are, or so I will argue. 
Remix culture is a more recent phenomenon than fan fiction.  
Thus, it is not surprising that norms with regard to fan fiction are bet-
ter formed.  Informal social norms have long played an important role 
in the fan-fiction community.  Before looking at these norms in par-
ticular, it is first worth offering an aside to consider the core structures 
that norms may take in order better to comprehend their creation 
and maintenance conditions. 
Norms are best viewed not as linguistic entities but rather as social 
practices of a certain sort (albeit ones that typically have linguistic en-
tities attached).34  The reason for drawing this distinction can now be 
made clear.  Social practices, unlike linguistic entities, are rationally 
governed in the sense that they are maintained as social practices be-
cause actors conform to them for rational reasons.  It is important to 
see that it is the behavior that matters in the end because that is what 
produces utility or disutility, and it is the behavior, or rather the col-
lection of conforming behaviors, that has strategic structures.35  The 
utility payouts to the players are mutually interactive.  In other words, 
the benefit that one player receives for conforming will typically de-
pend on choices made by others and vice versa.36  In addition, norms 
qua patterns of social behavior typically have sanctions attached, and 
conformity to them is typically prescribed by one person to another, 
although these characteristics are not essential.37
There are three basic types of rational norms:  prisoner’s dilemma 
(PD) norms, coordination norms, and epistemic norms.38  For each of 
these types of norms, the rationality of one’s conformity is affected by 
the behavior of others.  For example, under a coordination norm, one 
may be indifferent between two options in the abstract (such as driv-
34 See HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 18, at 24-36, 306 (critiquing linguistic views of 
norms and providing an extensive definition). 
35 Id. ch. 2. 
36 Id. at 39. 
37 Id. at 28. 
38 Id. at 39. 
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ing on the left as opposed to the right side of the road), but when one 
becomes aware of what others are doing, one’s preference becomes to 
conform, because one receives a “coordination benefit” from doing 
what others are doing and a “coordination loss” from doing the oppo-
site.39
For example, a tremendous new source of creative content is be-
ing produced by people who post their creative efforts to social-
networking sites such as MySpace.  The production of this content is 
plausibly modeled as being governed by norms that have the structure 
of a coordination norm.40  What this means in practical terms is that if 
others are participating in social networking, then the individual has 
an incentive to do so as well, in the same manner as others.41  As a re-
sult, external forms of motivation may not be necessary to incentivize 
the continued production of this type of creative work once the norm 
is set in motion.  If true, this would surely be of interest to copyright 
law, which has as its essential goal the incentivization of creative 
works.42
With epistemic norms, the fact that others are conforming to 
some normatively governed pattern of behavior is evidence of the ra-
tionality of one’s conformity.  Here, conformity is an information-cost-
saving device.43  The rational-actor model assumes that the players in 
strategic games have enough information about their situations, the 
strategic structure of the game, and the other players to know whether 
they are free riders or instead cooperators in iterated games.  On a 
more sophisticated model, however, we must not assume perfect in-
39 See id. at 46-47, 46 figs.2.5 & 2.6 (providing game-theoretic matrices and exam-
ples to illustrate coordination benefits and losses). 
40 See Steven A. Hetcher, The Emergence of Website Privacy Norms, 7 MICH. TELECOMM.
& TECH. L. REV. 97, 122-26 (2001) [hereinafter Hetcher, Website Privacy Norms] (dis-
cussing the coordination norms that discourage websites from adopting stringent user-
data-collection and privacy policies). 
41 See Danah Boyd, Why Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites:  The Role of Networked Pub-
lics in Teenage Social Life, in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 126 (David Bucking-
ham ed., 2008), available at http://www.danah.org/papers/WhyYouthHeart.pdf (noting 
that teenagers join social-networking sites in part due to peer pressure). 
42 See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The 
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ crea-
tive labor.  But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for 
the general public good.”), superseded by statute, Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541, 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.). 
43 See HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 18, at 28 (noting that the information-cost-
saving feature of some norms explains why prescriptivity is not always necessary to en-
force them). 
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formation as a constant.44  We will see that relaxing the assumption of 
perfect information is informative in the context of norms qua prac-
tices constituted of conforming acts.  For example, this assumption 
tends to be more factually accurate in close-knit communities.  In 
other circumstances, however, assuming perfect information is simply 
unrealistic.  Depending on the circumstances, a more realistic ap-
proach to determining one’s best course of action, such as whether 
some particular creative work is a fair use, is to conform to the behav-
ior of others. 
Elsewhere, I discuss hybrid norms that are constituted of different 
sorts of motivation to conform.  In the context of the norm whereby 
ordinary users by the millions think it is socially acceptable to remix, it 
is plausible that some conform in order to receive the coordination 
benefits of doing what others are doing, while others conform in or-
der to save on the information costs of determining if conformity is 
rationally justified.  Indeed, given the set of circumstances ordinary 
users are exposed to, it is completely sensible that they should implic-
itly conclude that a wide range of remix activity is socially acceptable 
and indeed of positive social value.  It is implausible to argue that 
typical remixers know the law.  For them, the existence of increasingly 
pervasive remix practices has important epistemic value, both in terms 
of indicating the practice’s legality as well as its potential as a source of 
coordination benefits. 
Under PD norms, rational actors will also look to the behavior of 
others, but in the hope of free riding on this behavior should the op-
portunity present itself.  In a single-shot game, rational actors will de-
fect.45  But a social practice, due to the continuing nature of its par-
ticipants, implies that it is not a single-shot game.  Conformity to the 
social practice is rational because the payoff is typically higher for con-
formity than for defection, given the iterative nature of the game.46  As 
44 See id. at 191-92 (noting the tendency of behavior to converge towards social 
practices in the absence of perfect information). 
45 See Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 149, 199 n.179 (2001) (noting that the cooperation of players in David 
Axelrod’s computer-tournament experiment depended on whether the game was re-
peated).
46 I have written elsewhere that 
[w]hen there is an opportunity for the parties to interact over time in a repeat 
game situation, however, then it may be rational for each party to adopt a co-
operative strategy in which each defers the immediate gain from defection in 
order to attempt to realize the long-term gain that may result from cooperation. 
HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 18, at 298. 
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will be seen below, fan-fiction creators are engaged in a PD game with 
one another when it comes to commercializing their works. 
As the preceding discussion indicates, being clear on the strategic 
structure of norms matters because it is this structure that will often be 
dispositive in determining whether an individual continues to con-
form to a given social practice.  This in turn matters because any pol-
icy prescription must take account of the variety of factors that affect 
individuals’ motivation either to conform to socially desirable patterns 
of behavior or to be deterred from conforming to undesirable pat-
terns.  This Part will discuss three kinds of social norms that directly 
impact creators of fan-fiction and remix works:  (1) the norm of so-
cially acceptable and somewhat-encouraged amateur remix, (2) the 
norm against commercializing fan fiction, and (3) competing norms 
among owners regarding tolerance of noncommercial use. 
A.  The Norm of Socially Acceptable and Somewhat- 
Encouraged Amateur Remix 
Consider the rational structure of norms in the context of the 
sorts of social practices that give rise to this Article:  the normatively 
governed practices whereby, every day, large numbers of people use 
commercial copyright-protected works as elements in works of fan fic-
tion or remix that they create.  When this is done by amateurs in non-
commercial contexts, this social practice is deemed acceptable by a 
substantial number of relevant actors, as well as by society in general, 
to the extent that such a view may be discerned at all.47  Indeed, in 
some quarters, this behavior is strongly encouraged.48  Not all relevant 
actors accept this norm, but that is true of all norms.49  What is the 
47 See generally Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1459, 1463-64 (discussing how the public becomes emboldened to violate copy-
right law based on social norms in Web 2.0); Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent, supra
note 12, at 506-14 (noting that many people feel that fan fiction does not hurt, and 
may even help, the financial well-being of the copyright owner). 
48 See JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 152 (discussing Lucas-
film’s offer of free web space to Star Wars fans).  See generally Lee, supra note 47, at 
1486-88 (noting the phenomenon of hedging, whereby commercial copyright owners 
tacitly encourage users to create derivative works that can help market the main prod-
uct, enforcing the license only when the infringement is harmful). 
49 See Tushnet, Payment in Credit, supra note 22, at 141 (“[F]an fiction has attracted 
more attention from ‘free culture’ advocates who are concerned about copyright own-
ers’ attempts to channel and control popular culture.  Some copyright owners have 
also taken an aggressive stance against fan creativity, sending cease-and-desist letters 
threatening lawsuits to fan websites.”). 
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evidence of the existence of the norm?  First, of course, is widespread 
behavior of a given sort, namely, the millions of works of fan fiction 
that have been produced and shared in recent years.  Importantly, 
such behavior does not court social sanction; to the contrary, there is 
a great deal of social reinforcement of remixing in creative communities. 
As previously noted, fan-fiction and remix activity can plausibly be 
claimed to provide significant social benefits.  Thus, it is unsurprising 
that there is a norm that promotes this activity.  For example, Henry 
Jenkins, an educator himself, emphasizes the educational benefits to 
young people from participation in these activities and in the com-
munities built around them.50
Jenkins notes that creators of fan fiction and remix feel as if they 
have a right to such uses.51  One fan-fiction writer whom Jenkins inter-
viewed states that “[t]he text already belongs to us; we are not taking 
anything other than our own fantasies, so therefore we are not steal-
ing anything at all.”52  This quote highlights a stark difference between 
fan fiction and file sharing.  With fan fiction, there is an addition to 
the sum total of creative output, which is not the case with file sharing.  
Thus, unless the dynamic processes that are producing fan fiction dis-
incentivize the creation of the original works, we cannot help but em-
brace the set of regulatory forces that are responsible for the rise of 
fan fiction. 
The quote above and other commentary by fan-fiction enthusiasts 
implicitly assume that fanworks involve a substantial amount of crea-
tivity on the part of the fan author.  They assume a typical situation in 
which the creator borrows commercial characters such as Kirk and 
Spock from Star Trek and then creates a new fictional work, with a plot 
of her own concoction, based on these characters.  Indeed, this is the 
50 See JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 177-85 (describing fan-
fiction communities as distributed-knowledge “affinity spaces,” proposing that the 
practice promotes literacy, and discussing fanwork in the context of educational scaf-
folding and apprenticeship).  Jenkins discusses in detail the story of Heather, a brave 
and enterprising teenager who ran her own Harry Potter website and organized similar 
sites worldwide in a protest against their ill treatment by the Warner Brothers film stu-
dio.  Id. ch. 5.  The highlight of this sequence of events came when Heather debated a 
lawyer for Warner Brothers on Hardball with Chris Matthews, a television program de-
voted to current affairs and political punditry.  Id. at 187.
51 See id. at 191 (noting “the fans’ own sense of moral ‘ownership’” over copyright-
protected source material). 
52 Interview by Taylor Harrison with Henry Jenkins, in Tucson, Ariz. (Apr. 24, 
1994), in ENTERPRISE ZONES app. A at 267 (Taylor Harrison et al. eds., 1996) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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form that much fan fiction has taken in the past.53  Under such condi-
tions, it is not hard to understand why these creators would feel some 
degree of ownership or proprietary interest in the fanwork.  Such a 
feeling would be predicted as a matter of social science, to the extent 
that Lockean property intuitions have been empirically demon-
strated.54  Under this assumption, more fine-grained predictions be-
come possible and plausible.  For example, one would predict that the 
greater the proportion of new work in relation to borrowed work con-
tained in a particular remix, the greater the sense of ownership and 
entitlement one would expect on the part of the creator.55
Users have also been subject to advertising that famously has en-
couraged them to rip, mix, and burn.56  It is reasonable for an average 
person to think that if a high-profile company like Apple openly en-
courages certain behavior, it cannot be illegal or even wrong under 
dominant social norms.  Note, however, that Apple did not encourage 
users to share files. 
Permit me to add a personal anecdote here in support of the 
norm I am characterizing.  As a professor of copyright law in “Music 
City”—Nashville, Tennessee—I am asked by the Vanderbilt University 
administration to give a talk to undergraduates about file sharing 
every fall.  Each year I give the talk along with two persons from the 
administration whose job, in part, is to curtail student file sharing 
when notified by the Recording Industry Association of America 
(RIAA) of such activities on campus.  My task is a simple one:  to im-
part the message that file sharing is illegal and that one can get into 
trouble for engaging in it.  This is especially true at Vanderbilt, which 
is one of the schools allegedly targeted by the music industry.  I am 
never asked to comment on the legal status of making fan-fiction or 
53 See JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS, supra note 6, at 156 (“Fans, as one longtime 
Trekker explained, ‘treat the program like silly putty,’ stretching its boundaries to in-
corporate their concerns, remolding its characters to better suit their desires.”). 
54 See generally Nicholas Blomley, The Borrowed View:  Privacy, Propriety, and the En-
tanglements of Property, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 617 (2005) (arguing that Lockean prop-
erty rights can value autonomy as well as social duty). 
55 Conversely, the less creative matter added, the more the owner of the source 
work will feel like a victim of theft. 
56 Apple ran an iTunes advertisement in 2001 containing the slogan, “Rip.  Mix.  
Burn.”  Press Release, Apple, Apple Unveils New iMacs with CD-RW Drives and iTunes 
Software:  Rip, Mix, Burn Your Own Custom Music CDs (Feb. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2001/feb/22imac.html.  The television commercial 
ended with the words, “It’s your music.  Burn it on a Mac.”  Id.  The company’s press 
releases encouraged users to create custom music CDs with their iMacs.  See, e.g., id.
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remix works.57  I would speculate that I am not asked to comment on 
these issues because the RIAA and Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) are not demanding that the university address them.  
I would suggest that the RIAA and MPAA consider ending their at-
tempts at moral education of America’s youth regarding file sharing.  
It is hard enough to explain even to very smart college students how it 
can be illegal to make copies of CDs one owns when one can legally 
make copies of TV shows with a DVR.  From a pedagogical point of 
view, it would be futile to attempt to teach the legal rules applicable to 
fan fiction and remix.  The core of any such account would necessarily 
involve teaching fair use doctrine, a task that is simply impossible to 
accomplish in a brief span of time. 
Another reason that the RIAA and MPAA would be unlikely to 
further their interests by attempting to educate the masses about re-
mix is that one of the main arguments the industry has used to dis-
courage this practice in the past is that it not only hurts faceless cor-
porations, rich rock stars, and movie stars, but also threatens the 
livelihoods of all the people who work in these industries.58  This cyni-
cal claim loses all credibility in the context of fan fiction and remix, 
however, because it is implausible in most instances to argue that any-
one is harmed.  Indeed, it would be more intuitive for typical remixers 
to see how commercial owners would likely benefit from such activi-
ties.59  If anything, then, the implicit lesson that young people would 
57 The RIAA website, in a section entitled “Piracy:  Online and on the Street,” out-
lines a variety of actions that it considers illegal, but it does not mention remixes, 
mashups, or any similar activity.  Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am., Piracy:  Online and 
on the Street, http://www.riaa.com/physicalpiracy.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2009).  
The MPAA website, in a section entitled “Internet Piracy,” also sets out various actions 
that constitute piracy but does not discuss remixes or mashups.  Motion Picture Ass’n 
of Am., Internet Piracy, http://www.mpaa.org/piracy_internet.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 
2009).
58 See Lou Carlozo, Web Music Still a Free-for-All, Users Vow, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2001, 
§ 3, at 1 (“[T]he artists, the studios, the engineers—the entire food chain that’s in-
volved in this—is harmed.  And we’ve got to sensitize people to that fact.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
59 For example, Star Trek fan-fiction writers in the early 1960s and 1970s organized 
the first Star Trek conventions after feeling unwelcome at World-Con and other science-
fiction conventions.  These same fans were responsible for the letter-writing campaign 
that saved the show from cancellation after its second season.  The continuation of the 
franchise since then, spawning three spin-off series and ten films, has obviously made a 
great deal of money for Paramount.  See generally Francesca Coppa, A Brief History of 
Media Fandom, in FAN FICTION AND FAN COMMUNITIES IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 41, 
45-48 (Karen Hellekson & Kristina Busse eds., 2006) (describing the history of Star Trek
fandom). 
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take away from forced education on the evils of file sharing is that re-
mix is not a parallel sort of evil or, for that matter, an evil at all. 
What could meaningfully be done, however, is simply to provide 
the bottom-line conclusion that much fan fiction and remix is fair use, 
and hence legal, while complete digital copies of works that remain 
largely unchanged are unlikely to be embraced by that doctrine.60  I 
think it would be reasonably intuitive to students that the latter sort of 
uses would be closer to plain-vanilla exact copies—and hence morally 
equivalent to file sharing—than they are to remix works. 
Scholars often write as if all norms are structured such that they 
are rules that members enforce against one another.61  But as I have 
argued in detail elsewhere, this feature is not true of all norms.62  To 
take a prosaic example, it is a norm that parents teach their children 
to look both ways before crossing the street.  This norm does not have 
a PD structure such that not to conform is to free ride.  Instead, others 
are indifferent as to whether any given individual looks both ways be-
fore crossing the street.  The norms at issue with much remix creation 
are similar.  They are best seen as a particular instantiation of the 
more general norm that what is not forbidden is permitted.  Thus, be-
cause there is no norm prohibiting remix, the situation falls back onto 
the norm of permissibility.  From a policy perspective, it matters not 
just that, as a formal matter, children feel free to remix but also that 
they are more inclined to do so because others are as well.  This norm 
has the structure of a coordination norm.63  One is more inclined to 
conform in light of the conformity of others.  As eighteen-year-old 
Skyler says, “If you’re not on MySpace, you don’t exist.”64
B.  The Norm Against Commercializing Fan Fiction 
Now consider the second important social norm—the norm 
against the commercialization of amateur users’ works.  As we saw 
60 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that 
“transformative” works are embraced by the fair use doctrine). 
61 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 app. at 340 (2006) (defining so-
cial norms as “many slight and sometimes forceful sanctions that members of a com-
munity impose on each other”). 
62 See HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 18, at 2-3 (arguing that coordination and epis-
temic norms are not sanction driven). 
63 See Hetcher, Website Privacy Norms, supra note 40, at 122-23 (defining a coordina-
tion norm as a practice in which each user who conforms receives a “coordination 
benefit” derived from the conformity of others). 
64 Boyd, supra note 41, at 119. 
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above, fan fiction preceded remix culture historically.  Fan fiction was 
circulated among groups and communities from the beginning.65
Some commentators have described these communities as “close-
knit.”66  Within the fan-fiction community, there is a norm against 
seeking commercial gain.67  Initially, one might suppose that fan-
fiction writers are anticapitalist.  There is indeed a rational explana-
tion, however.  There is a fear in this tightly knit community that by 
seeking to commercialize their work, authors will draw unwelcome at-
tention to the entire community.68  Note that the community’s fear of 
attention does not necessarily mean that it is widely believed that the 
use made of copyrighted works is infringement.  Even if most such 
works are not infringements, no one wants to be sued. 
The community’s interests give rise to a pattern of strategic behav-
ior.  Members are inclined to take an interest in each other’s actions 
precisely because each person, in terms of the actual utilities and dis-
utilities, has an interest in any step that other members take to com-
mercialize their acts of remix.  Thus, the norm against commercial use 
in the fan-fiction community has the structure of an iterated PD.  In 
other words, at least some narrowly self-interested rational actors 
would defect from cooperation if they could get away with it.69  Defec-
65 See generally JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS, supra note 6, ch. 5 (describing fan-
fiction communities). 
66 See Fiesler, supra note 22, at 746 (“Fandoms are extremely close-knit communi-
ties, and members protect themselves by operating under a specific set of self-
regulating guidelines—their own social norms.”); see also Posting of Chris Vallance to 
BBC—Radio Five Live—Pods & Blogs, FanLib and Fan Fiction, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ 
blogs/podsandblogs/2007/05/fanlib_and_fan_fiction.shtml (May 23, 2007) (“There 
were many concerns voiced by fanfic writers but a key issue seems to be that a com-
mercial presence in fanfic will draw attention to a space that has operated as a close-
knit community . . . .”). 
67 See Fiesler, supra note 22, at 749-52 (describing the fan-fiction community’s 
techniques for self-policing this norm). 
68 See id. at 751 (discussing a quote from an irate fan calling attention to the legal 
“trouble [that could be brought] down on the fanfic ‘industry’” if a writer attempts to 
profit from her work (quoting Posting of Yuuo to The Pitfalls of Fanfiction, This Has 
Probably Been Ranted About Before . . ., http://community.livejournal.com/ 
fanficrants/3349486.html (Sept. 24, 2006))); Posting of Henry Jenkins to Confessions 
of an Aca-Fan, Transforming Fan Culture into User-Generated Content:  The Case of 
FanLib, http://www.henryjenkins.org/2007/05/transforming_fan_culture_into.html 
(May 22, 2007) (describing the uproar in the fan-fiction community when a commer-
cial website attempted to profit from fan fiction). 
69 Jenkins provides a good deal of support for the claim that many amateur crea-
tors would like to commercialize their works.  He notes that, “Historically, fan fiction 
ha[s] proven to be a point of entry into commercial publication for at least some ama-
teurs, who were able to sell their novels to the professional book series centering on 
1886 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1869
tion in this context means seeking commercial gain from one’s work.  
As with other PDs, one does better if others conform to a norm while 
one does not.  In the present context, the benefit that the free rider 
gets from the conformity of others is deflection of the unwanted at-
tention of commercial owners.  Owners are less likely to pursue legal 
action against the fan-fiction community if the community presents no 
commercial threat.  For those who conform to the noncommercial 
norm, however, the free rider creates costs.  By seeking commercial 
gain, the defector makes it more likely that commercial content own-
ers will begin to pay more attention to the fan-fiction community.  
Each of the conformers is therefore more likely to draw attention than 
would otherwise be the case. 
Norms theory would predict that conformers will seek means to 
force potential free riders to conform.  Typically, this occurs through 
sanctions or by threatening to cut the free rider off from the benefits 
of iterated play.  In the legal literature, Robert Ellickson provides the 
seminal account of the conditions under which groups will be able to 
solve their collective action problems.70  Like the groups cited by El-
lickson, fan-fiction communities are close knit.  This characteristic al-
lows for effective sanctioning behavior.  Sanctions are the means that 
groups use to incentivize conformity when free-riding would otherwise 
be an individual member’s first choice.71  As Ellickson’s model would 
the various franchises.”  JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 152.  He 
also notes that young digital filmmakers sometimes use fan films as a “calling card” to 
break into the industry.  Id. at 154.  For example, the creators of the Star Wars fan film 
George Lucas in Love intended it as a vehicle for getting producers and agents to notice 
them. Id. at 143.  In another specific example, one writer who was in the middle of 
writing a fan-fiction novel attempted to profit from it by “ask[ing] her readers to do-
nate money so that she could take time off from work in order to write full-time” and 
complete the novel.  Fiesler, supra note 22, at 751. 
70 See ELLICKSON, supra note 23, ch. 11 (discussing the emergence of cattle-trespass 
norms in the Old West, contract norms among close-knit Wisconsin businessmen, and 
whaling norms, all of which had the effect of reducing the need for litigation). 
71 See, e.g., id. at 188 (describing how cattle ranchers who failed to reimburse a 
neighbor for part of the construction of a “cost-justified boundary fence” would be sub-
ject to the creditor’s “measured self-help”).  Note that many in the group only adhere 
to the norm against commercial use for the instrumental reason that they think that 
they have something to gain by it.  Fiesler describes in detail the case of Laura Jareo, 
who self-published her novel Another Hope and listed it on Amazon.  She was heavily 
criticized on fan-fiction blogs such as Fandom Wank.  Fiesler, supra note 22, at 750-51.  
Fiesler concludes that “the reason that there are not more cases like Jareo’s is not 
merely fear of traditional copyright enforcement actions, but also fear of social sanc-
tions in the fan fiction community.”  Id. at 757. 
2009] Social Norms, Fan Fiction, and Remix Culture 1887
predict, there is indeed a strong sanctioning regime in place in fan-
fiction communities. 
C.  Competing Norms Among Owners Regarding  
Tolerance of Noncommercial Use 
There is a third norm pertaining to fan fiction that is closely re-
lated to the previous one.  Under this norm, owners will not prosecute 
remix creators who use their works but who do not seek to commer-
cialize them.  This is not an established norm but a putative one.  In 
actuality, there is an ongoing battle between this more tolerant norm 
and one that does not tolerate such uses. 
From the perspective of norms theory, the question whether there 
is a norm boils down to the question whether there are conforming 
behavior and interactive utilities.  There are both empirical and con-
ceptual reasons to think that the behavior of commercial owners has a 
normative component.  The empirical evidence comes from the fact 
that the industry has developed standards for user-generated con-
tent.72  While these principles were initially proffered as creating best 
practices for all relevant parties—commercial owners, fan authors, 
and viewers—only the owners were at the table when the norms were 
drafted.  Unsurprisingly, their interests were largely served.73  The ex-
istence of these practices indicates that the commercial content indus-
try perceives some mutual benefit in developing a uniform set of 
norms to which each member can attempt to hold the others. 
The second reason to think the behavior has a normative compo-
nent is that it has a strategic structure.  The question which type of 
norm is involved is answered not by the fact of conformity but by the 
motivation for conformity.  If actors conform only to avoid sanctions 
and the loss of future interactions in iterated games, but in the ab-
sence of these considerations would prefer to free-ride on the benefits 
created by the conformity of others, then the practice has the struc-
ture of a PD norm.  We would want to ask, for example, the following 
72 See generally User Generated Content Principles, http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (setting forth a list of principles, for websites providing user-
uploaded audio and video content, meant to encourage creativity while thwarting in-
fringement).
73 See Press Release, Internet and Media Industry Leaders Unveil Principles To 
Foster Online Innovation While Protecting Copyrights (Oct. 18, 2007), available at
http://www.ugcprinciples.com/press_release.html (indicating that the principles were 
generated solely by commercial owners and focusing on the development of filtering 
technology and the removal of links to other sites containing infringing content). 
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sort of question:  would George Lucas want other owners to be toler-
ant toward remixers so that he could free-ride on the resulting bene-
fits?  The answer clearly seems to be no.74  There seems to be no free-
rider benefit that accrues to an owner as a result of other commercial 
owners declining to seek legal redress against amateur remixers. 
In fact, the opposite is the case.  If there is a norm of tolerance 
among owners, then a particular owner who seeks redress is more 
likely to stand out as intolerant.  This is what happened to Warner 
Brothers in its overly zealous defense of creative properties against 
amateur Harry Potter–based works.  The studio was lambasted for tar-
geting Harry Potter websites run by children and teens.75  The fact that 
many other commercial owners were de facto tolerant of such uses 
made Warner Brothers stand out as particularly unreasonable.  Thus, 
the putative norm among owners to tolerate noncommercial content 
has the structure of a coordination norm.  Any given owner has reason 
to do what other owners are doing.  The more tolerant others are, the 
more it is in a particular commercial owner’s interest to be tolerant as 
well.  The utilities are interactive in that when one acts in conformity 
with others, one receives more utility for doing so than would other-
wise be the case. 
There are prominent commercial content owners on each side of 
this battle of norms.  During her copyright-infringement lawsuit 
against the publisher of a Harry Potter encyclopedia, J.K. Rowling indi-
cated that she would not oppose online noncommercial uses of her 
work:
[T]here is a big difference between the innumerable Harry Potter fan 
sites’ latitude to discuss the Harry Potter Works in the context of free, 
ephemeral websites and unilaterally repackaging those sites for sale in an 
effort to cash in monetarily on Ms. Rowling’s creative works in contra-
vention of her . . . rights.
76
Other owners have explicitly stated that some fanworks are fair 
uses.77  At the other extreme are owners who bring lawsuits and send 
74 As Jenkins relates, LucasArts has varied its stance on fanworks but has become 
more tolerant over time.  JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 148-59. 
75 See id. at 185-88 (describing how the intense reaction led the senior vice presi-
dent of Warner Brothers Family Entertainment both to admit that the legal response 
had been “naïve” and to develop a more collaborative policy similar to Lucasfilm’s). 
76 Complaint at 3, Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-9667). 
77 When asked why he allowed fan fiction of his work, Neil Gaiman replied, “Be-
cause fan fiction is fan fiction.  I don’t believe I’ll lose my rights to my characters and 
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cease-and-desist letters.78  Whether the norm of commercial owners’ 
tolerance of amateur remix uses can be effectively established as a so-
cial practice of the owner community is an important policy question.  
To the extent that this norm is instantiated, there will be less harass-
ment of fair users by the owners of commercial works.79
In order better to understand what would be involved in establish-
ing and maintaining this norm, it is useful to consider its strategic 
structure, which turns on the costs and benefits of commercial own-
ers’ taking legal action against noncommercial remixers.  The costs 
are straightforward:  principally there would be the cost of monitoring 
the Internet for uses of one’s work and the cost of pursuing legal ac-
books if I allow/fail to prevent/turn a blind eye to people writing say Neverwhere fic-
tion, as long as those people aren’t, say, trying to sell books with my characters in 
[them].”  Posting of Neil Gaiman to Neil Gaiman’s Journal, How To Survive a Collabora-
tion, http://journal.neilgaiman.com/2004/06/how-to-survive-collaboration.asp ( June 3, 
2004).  Gaiman further stated that his attitude is not “particularly uncommon among 
authors.” Id.; see also Malene Arpe, Television’s Afterlife, TORONTO STAR, May 22, 2004, 
at J1 (quoting Joss Whedon, creator of Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Firefly, as saying, “I 
absolutely love it.  I wish I had grown up in the era of fan fiction . . . . That’s why I 
made these shows.  I didn’t make them so that people would enjoy them and forget 
them; I made them so they would never be able to shake them.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  George Lucas famously gave fan-fiction writers permission to publish 
stories as long as they were nonerotic and not for profit. JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CUL-
TURE, supra note 5, at 150.  Even J.K. Rowling has publicly said that fans may write fan 
fiction, though she has noted that she does not read it and that it makes her somewhat 
uncomfortable.  See MELISSA ANELLI, HARRY, A HISTORY 92-93 (2008) (quoting Rowling 
as stating, “I felt that we needed to be hands off, accept it as flattering . . . . I’ve never 
read any fanfiction online.  I know about some of it.  I just don’t want to go there.  It is
uncomfortable for the writer of the original work . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
78 See, e.g., JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 151-52 (describing 
Viacom’s crackdown on “fanzines”); id. at 185-88 (describing Warner Brothers’ at-
tempts to shut down Harry Potter fansites); Posting of Lady MacBeth to MediaMiner, 
Authors/Publishers Who Do Not Allow Fan Fiction, http://www.mediaminer.org/ 
blog/index.php?archives/23-AuthorsPublishers-Who-Do-Not-Allow-Fan-Fiction.html 
(Oct. 8, 2006) (maintaining a list of “authors or publishers who have made statements 
on their websites or have filed Cease and Desist notices against fan fiction writers”). 
79 Lessig downplays the tension between commercial and noncommercial use for 
purposes of fair use analysis.  This may serve his larger strategic purpose of minimizing 
the importance of any distinction “between text on one hand and film/music/images 
on the other.”  LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 55.  He argues that however “sensi-
ble . . . [the commercial/noncommercial] distinction might seem, it is in fact not how 
the rules are being enforced just now.”  Id.  Lessig cites the example of Disney’s com-
plaining about children at a kindergarten painting Mickey on a wall, clearly a non-
commercial use.  Id.  He also discusses how jazz musicians tolerated the practice of 
other musicians improvising on their works and argues that remix artists should be 
able to commercialize their creativity.  See id. at 103-05, 255. 
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tion of various sorts.80  Perhaps the best statement regarding these 
costs comes in Viacom’s 2008 complaint against YouTube.  Viacom al-
leged that “Defendants continue to infringe Plaintiffs’ works and im-
pose on Plaintiffs the substantial costs and burdens of locating and 
demanding the removal of their copyrighted works from Defendants’ 
website.”81
What are the benefits to commercial owners that would justify 
their expenditures on enforcement?  In the classic online-piracy cases 
Napster and Grokster, the benefit was clear:  file sharing was perceived 
to be a huge threat to the core business model of the record labels, 
which was to sell recorded music.  Here, the cost-benefit analysis was 
straightforward:  the costs of enforcement versus the benefits to be 
gained from stopping or slowing the rate of file sharing.  With ama-
teur remix, however, the direct, tangible benefits to the Viacoms of 
the world are not clear, as there is arguably no direct threat to their 
business models from most fan fiction and remix.82  Indeed, owners 
will sometimes stand to benefit from enhanced exposure of their 
works, for example, through the fostering of a more devoted fan base.83
80 Discussion has tended to focus on Internet remix, but if we take the broader 
topic to be monitoring for unauthorized uses generally, then, depending on the com-
mercial works at issue, monitoring might take other forms.  For example, Bridgeport 
Music monitors commercially released music in order to seek and destroy unauthor-
ized sampling of works that it controls.  Tim Wu, Jay-Z Versus the Sample Troll:  The Shady 
One-Man Corporation That’s Destroying Hip-Hop, SLATE, Nov. 16, 2006, http:// 
www.slate.com/id/2153961. 
81 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages 
and Demand for Jury Trial at 19, Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 
461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-2103) [hereinafter First Amended Complaint]; see also
Linda Rosencrance, Prince Fights YouTube, eBay over Copyrighted Content, COMPUTER-
WORLD, Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do? 
command=viewArticleBasic&articleID=9037578 (quoting Prince’s lawyer as saying, “We 
notify YouTube of infringements and they remove the files, but it goes on ad infinitum 
at Prince’s expense . . . . Now the onus is on artists and rights’ creators to police You-
Tube at their expense . . . .”). 
82 Of course, this is not to say that Viacom did not allege damages.  See First 
Amended Complaint, supra note 81, at 9. (“Additional massive damages to plaintiffs 
and others have been caused by Google’s preservation and backing of YouTube’s in-
fringing business model.”). 
83 See, e.g., JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 191 (describing fans 
as “‘inspirational consumers’ whose efforts help generate broader interests in [com-
mercial owners’] properties”); LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 259 (“For with the re-
moval of a legal barrier to fan action, more fans will participate in that fan action.  And 
the more who devote their efforts toward Warner creative products, the better it is for 
Warner.”); Coppa, supra note 59, at 45-48 (discussing the early Star Trek fan community). 
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One reason that commercial owners seek to stop fan uses is to 
control their characters.84  Another potential reason might be that 
owners fear that the norm against commercial use will break down 
and lead to increased commercialization of fanworks and remix.  If 
owners see the norm against commercialization starting to give way to 
a norm of tolerance, all else equal, they will be more inclined to take 
broad action against all unauthorized uses.  As we saw in the previous 
discussion of the norm against commercial use maintained in the fan-
fiction community, it is precisely this fear that has motivated fan-
fiction entrepreneurs to zealously promote the noncommercial 
norm.85  Nevertheless, this would be a more amorphous sort of harm 
than that suffered by the music industry, which has witnessed CD sales 
declining year after year since the advent of file sharing. 
Thus, I would postulate that the general disinclination of owners 
to prosecute noncommercial remix is indicative of the fact that en-
forcement behavior is simply not justified in cost-benefit terms.  The 
monitoring and legal costs of ending remix are real and measurable, 
while the benefits are amorphous and difficult to quantify. 
II. REGULATORY OPTIONS IN A WORLD OF SHIFTING NORMS
Recall that, in the Introduction, I stated that I would first set out 
the positive account of the regulatory role played by social norms.  As 
we have seen, this role is pervasive and powerful.  The normative ques-
tion next presents itself:  is the role for social norms detailed in Part I 
optimal in terms of promoting the goals of copyright?  At first glance, 
one might well conclude that things are working out exceedingly well, 
judging from the simple fact that fan fiction and remix culture are 
exploding.  Since these new and distinctive types of works themselves 
are of clear and distinct value in serving core goals of copyright law, 
84 Some authors, while stopping short of pursuing legal action, have publicly ex-
pressed their distaste for fan fiction, sometimes asking fans to refrain from writing it.  
See, e.g., Robert J. Hughes, Return to the Range, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6–7, 2008, at W2 (de-
scribing the constant irritation felt by Annie Proulx, author of the short story Brokeback 
Mountain, from fans who send in derivative manuscripts); Anne Rice, Messages to 
Anne Rice Fans, http://www.annerice.com/ReaderInteraction-MessagesToFans.html 
(last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (“I do not allow fan fiction.  The characters are copyrighted.  
It upsets me terribly to even think about fan fiction with my characters.  I advise my 
readers to write your own original stories with your own characters.  It is absolutely es-
sential that you respect my wishes.”). 
85 See supra Section I.A. 
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the three norms that play a material role in making them possible are 
valuable by implication as well. 
Yet all may not be so simple.  While norms are demonstrably pow-
erful regulators both in the present context and in general, they are 
informal regulators and thus, by definition, do not have the stability of 
formal law; they can easily change.  Flexibility can be a positive or 
negative attribute depending on whether it is used in the service of 
desirable policy goals on the one hand or nefarious private interests 
on the other.  For example, in an important recent case, Prince and 
his record label, Universal, took legal action against a mother, 
Stephanie Lenz, who had posted a video on YouTube of her toddler 
dancing with a Prince song barely audible in the background.86  This 
sort of overreaching use of copyright law against ordinary people 
rightly causes commentators to call for legal reform.87  The possibility 
of cases like Lenz raises the question whether regular people require 
stronger protection than that provided by current norms.  Because 
the norms studied in Part I are not law, there would appear to be 
nothing to stop these norms from changing should the underlying 
conditions of their maintenance change.  This is more than a mere 
abstract possibility; consider the fact that the anticommercialization 
norm discussed above has the strategic structure of an iterated PD.  
This means that the maintenance of the norm is dependent on the 
increasingly difficult task of sustaining close-knit communities. 
In their efforts to characterize a distinctive noncommercial crea-
tive economy, both Tushnet and Lessig talk in detail about the non-
commercial motivations that drive the creation of much fan fiction 
and remix.88  Indeed, this attention is well deserved, as noncommer-
cialism is an important feature of remix.  Yet one must not lose sight 
of the fact that many amateur creators will seek to commercialize their 
86 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-52 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  
Lenz, in turn, alleged that Universal had taken legal action in bad faith.  See id. at 1156-
57 (denying Universal’s motion to dismiss Lenz’s lawsuit). 
87 See, e.g., Rebecca F. Ganz, Note, A Portrait of the Artist’s Estate as a Copyright Prob-
lem, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 739, 758 (2008) (pointing to the Lenz case as an example of 
copyright misuse and the overly aggressive defense of intellectual property); Tyler 
McCormick Love, Note, Throwing the Flag on Copyright Warnings:  How Professional Sports 
Organizations Systematically Overstate Copyright Protection, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 369, 381-
82 (2008) (using the Lenz case to illustrate the need to strengthen the copyright-misuse 
doctrine to discourage copyright misrepresentation). 
88 See, e.g., Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 657 (“The ethos of fandom is 
one of community, of shared journeys to understanding and enjoyment. . . . Fans also 
see themselves as guardians of the texts they love, purer than the owners in some ways 
because they seek no profit.” (footnote omitted)). 
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work if they can.  The reason is obvious:  most people need to make a 
living.  If some people are gifted at creating fanworks, it would be 
natural for them to seek to support themselves in this manner, rather 
than with a day job, in order to sustain their art. 
As noted in the discussion of the noncommercial norm, Henry 
Jenkins provides a good deal of evidence that many creators have 
mixed motivations.89  The practical implication of this is that we can-
not take the current degree of adherence to the norm of noncom-
mercialization as a given; rather, we must treat it as a variable that may 
change as a function of the relative costs and benefits of adhering to 
the noncommercial norm versus the costs and benefits of seeking to 
commercialize one’s works.90
In a world where the norm of noncommercial use is weakened, 
one can predict that there will be more commercial use as the costs of 
commercial use decrease.  The sanctioning regime that creates costs 
for commercializing begins to lose its ability to drive cooperative be-
havior through sanctioning, interested-play, and reputational effects 
within communities that are decreasingly close knit.  This is relevant 
because as old-school fan fiction has broadened to embrace fanworks, 
media fiction, remix, or whatever we choose to call it, close-knit com-
munities are disappearing.91  In turn, the Ellicksonian forces of itera-
tion and overlapping interaction—forces that encourage actors to 
89 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.  In discussing the different reasons 
why fan filmmakers have made Star Wars movies, Jenkins describes (1) a creator who 
wanted to “do something that would get the agents and producers to put the tapes into 
their VCRs instead of throwing them away,” (2) a fourteen-year-old who wanted to have 
fun with his friends, (3) the members of a wedding party who made a film as a tribute 
to the bride and groom, (4) students who made films as school projects, and (5) mem-
bers of Star Wars fan clubs who made films as collective projects. JENKINS, CONVER-
GENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 143 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 Note that I am not claiming that all creators of fanworks would necessarily make 
this calculation.  Tushnet and Lessig are right to emphasize the noncommercial nature 
of many fan-fiction creations.  It is enough for the effect I am hypothesizing that some 
material number of creators would be so motivated.  Jenkins’s account on this issue is 
well researched and reasoned; nothing that either Lessig or Tushnet says contradicts it.  
Neither denies that there either are or could be under friendlier incentives a material 
number of creators who would commercialize if they could. See also HARDIN, supra note 
20, at 183 (“[A]fter trying, at substantial loss, to punish the loner for stubborn defec-
tion, the [rest of the group] might all begin to suspect that they would gain more over 
the long run by tolerating a free rider than by further attempting to get the loner to 
cooperate.”). 
91 See Tushnet, Payment in Credit, supra note 22, at 154-55 (“[W]ith the increasing 
variety and visibility of fan creativity, new fans are not always initiated by more experi-
enced ones.  They may not learn the norms of the preexisting community when they 
start sharing their own stories and art, including norms of explicitly disclaiming ownership.”). 
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forego short-term gain in favor of long-term cooperation—are dimin-
ishing.
Thus, as we move from a world dominated by fan fiction to a more 
freewheeling society dominated by remix, there is likely to be a break-
down of the second norm against commercializing fanworks.  This 
may lead owners of creative content to sue more of the Stephanie 
Lenzes of the world.  As a result, the third norm may shift in the direc-
tion of decreased tolerance of remix as the perception grows that law-
suits are needed to create fear and panic among users. 
The potential for a breakdown of the noncommercial norm and 
the consequent victory of the intolerance camp regarding the third 
norm may be highly significant if it leads to greater harassment of fair 
users by commercial owners.  This outcome is widely viewed in the 
copyright-policy community as undesirable.  But if norms are not the 
optimal regulatory solution in a changing world, what is?  There are 
two obvious candidates.  First, formal law—for example, the Copyright 
Statute—may be changed in some way to more fully support fan fic-
tion and remix.  The second is to seek a means by which existing fair 
use doctrine can play a more effective role in supporting fan fiction 
and remix than it currently does.  With regard to a change in formal 
law, the most straightforward solution would be to legalize fan fiction 
and remix.  In his important new book, Lessig argues for the legaliza-
tion of amateur remix.92  This would be an important step, as it effec-
tively does away with the derivative-works right.  This change, however, 
might also do away with frivolous suits against fair users that have the 
effect of making the legal right of fair use practically worthless to 
those who possess it.  This potential outcome makes legalization worth 
considering despite the fact that the derivative-works right could be 
taken away.93  Lessig’s account is sophisticated and worth examining in 
detail.  Subsequent discussion will consider the potential for fair use 
doctrine to play a more constructive role than is presently the case.94
92 See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 255 (“There is no good reason for copyright 
law to regulate this [amateur] creativity.  There is plenty of reason—both costs and 
creative—for it to leave that bit free.”). 
93 Note as well that if amateur remix were legal, then it would not matter that the 
second and third norms studied in Part I were breaking down because, even if they 
did, the amateur creator would be protected by the fact that her creative efforts were 
legal.  Thus, she would not have to rely on the kindness of strangers or, in other words, 
forbearance or tolerance on the part of commercial owners. 
94 See infra Part IV. 
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III. LESSIG’S VISION OF AMERICA: MILLIONS 
OF KIDS IN ORANGE JUMPSUITS
Lawrence Lessig’s new book, Remix, is evidently written, to some 
extent, for a nonacademic audience.  Given the subtitle—“Making Art 
and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy”—it is reasonable to 
guess that its intended audience extends beyond academia into the 
larger business- and Internet-policy crowd.  This makes the book a 
challenge—albeit a highly worthwhile one—with regard to serious 
academic interpretation, as it is the work of an authority on an impor-
tant subject, yet it is argued in a narrative, polemical, and entertaining 
style, utilizing textual and rhetorical devices not typically associated 
with scholarly writing. 
Whereas Lessig’s goal is polemical, mine is to provide a more 
evenhanded normative evaluation, even if this means that a goal such 
as shocking the legal academy into a heightened appreciation of re-
mix is less than optimally served as a result.  Just as there is value in 
provoking a response through the use of strong polemical language, 
there is also value in a more neutral approach that ventures into the 
gray areas that shade any complex normative issue.  Lessig character-
izes himself as a peacemaker in the so-called “copyright wars.”95  This 
is a clever bit of rhetoric:  who can argue with peace?  To his credit, 
however, Lessig is more aptly characterized as a warrior in the copy-
right wars, fighting to make the world safe for free culture.96
Lessig sees his opponents as the commercial creative-content in-
dustries.  Their goal is profit, not sound public policy.  In their pursuit 
of profit, these industries are polemical in their characterization of 
unauthorized users as thieves and criminals.97  It is perhaps the case 
that this profit-driven characterization is best responded to polemi-
cally with an account equally one sided, but in the opposite direction.  
This is, after all, the model of zealous advocacy that law professors 
teach to their students.  Lessig’s book is a defense of a view that is 
fairly characterized as extreme inasmuch as legalizing remix effec-
tively does away with the derivative-works right when amateur works 
are involved.  Given that the field of amateur creative works is experi-
95 LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at xv-xvi. 
96 Lessig notes that “[i]t’s been a decade since I got myself into the fight against 
copyright extremism.”  Id. at 293. 
97 See id. at xvii (describing Jack Valenti’s rhetoric on behalf of the Motion Picture 
Association of America). 
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encing explosive growth, the derivative-works right would correlatively 
experience dramatic shrinkage under Lessig’s proposed regime. 
My approach has a different starting point and a different goal.  It 
is no part of my project to counteract the profit-driven polemics of the 
commercial content industry.  Once one assumes a more neutral pos-
ture, it becomes necessary to set out the costs as well as the benefits of 
the phenomenon under examination—even if this amounts to expos-
ing the tender underbelly of one’s position, such that it may be more 
effectively skewered by those whose goal is not good policy but profit.  
The starting point for appreciating a more subtle policy response than 
direct legalization of amateur remix thus begins with an appreciation 
of the potential for harm that a broader solution would engender.  
Accordingly, the examination of Lessig’s argument below will be un-
dertaken with the objective of evaluating whether the policy proposal 
that he supports would serve or undermine the goals of copyright law. 
As someone trained in analytic philosophy, my natural instinct for 
taming a text is to seek out the syllogisms.  Thus, the following discus-
sion will first seek to set out Lessig’s core arguments in syllogistic 
form.  Subsequent discussion will then seek to determine which of the 
premises is true and, correlatively, which of the conclusions is true.  I 
extract five arguments, which I will first list seriatim in order to better 
capture the overall flow of Lessig’s argument. 
 Argument One :
(1) Remixing is criminal.98
(2) The rising generation uses its computers largely for remix-
ing activities.99
Therefore, the rising generation is made up of criminals. 
 Argument Two :
(1) The rising generation is made up of criminals. 
98 Lessig writes that 
[i]n a world in which technology begs all of us to create and spread creative 
work differently from how it was created and spread before, what kind of 
moral platform will sustain our kids, when their ordinary behavior is deemed 
criminal?  Who will they become?  What other crimes will to them seem natural? 
Id. at xviii. 
99 See id. at 19 (arguing that we should “reform the rules that render criminal most 
of what your kids do with their computers”). 
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(2) Making children criminals is bad for them and for society, 
as it will lead to disrespect for the law, more criminal activ-
ity, and potentially punishment of the sort meted out to 
file sharers.100
(3) If remixing were legal, our children would not be criminals 
and thus would not suffer the harm of being labeled crimi-
nals.101
Therefore, we should make remixing legal so that our children will 
no longer be criminals and thus they and society will not suffer the 
harm of children being criminals. 
Argument Three :
(1) In addition to turning children into criminals, laws against 
remix culture will deter development of institutions of lit-
eracy.102
(2) Institutions of literacy should not be deterred.103
Therefore, laws against remix culture should be dispensed with in 
order to promote institutions of literacy and the social good they create. 
Argument Four :
100 Lessig writes, “I worry about the effect this war is having upon our kids.  What is 
this war doing to them?  Whom is it making them?  How is it changing how they think 
about normal, right-thinking behavior?  What does it mean to a society when a whole 
generation is raised as criminals?”  Id. at xvii.  Throughout, Lessig presents a parade of 
horribles and suggests that this is what lies in store for remixers, who follow in the 
footsteps, legally speaking, of file sharers.  He asks, “Should we continue the expul-
sions from universities?  The threat of multimillion-dollar civil judgments?  Should we 
increase the vigor with which we wage war against these terrorists?  Should we sacrifice 
ten or a hundred to a federal prison (for their actions under current law are felonies), 
so that others learn to stop what today they do with ever-increasing frequency?”  Id. at 
xviii (internal quotation marks omitted).  Lessig ominously suggests that once we turn 
our children into criminals, they will turn on us:  “I then want to spotlight the damage 
we’re not thinking enough about—the harm to a generation from rendering criminal 
what comes naturally to them.  What does it do to them?  What do they then do to us?”  
Id. at 18. 
101 This premise is implicit. 
102 Lessig argues that 
the law as it stands now will stanch the development of the institutions of liter-
acy that are required if this literacy is to spread.  Schools will shy away, since 
this remix is presumptively illegal.  Businesses will be shy, since rights holders 
are still eager to use the law to threaten new uses. 
Id. at 108. 
103 This premise is implicit. 
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(1) Remixes cause no harm.104
(2) Creative practices that cause no harm should not be im-
peded by the law.105
(3) Creative practices that produce social benefits should be 
promoted by copyright law.106
(4) Remix culture creates social benefits.107
Therefore, remix cultural practices should not be impeded but in-
stead supported by legal rules. 
Argument Five :
(1) There is no sensible reason to criminalize remix culture; 
rather, it is the unintended collateral damage of the war 
that has been fought against file sharing.108
104 When the mashup artist Girl Talk told Lessig in an interview that he could not 
understand why anyone should want to censor his music since, unlike “bootlegging,” it 
was not hurting anyone, Lessig replied, “Why anyone ‘should’ was a question I couldn’t 
answer.”  Id. at 13.  Furthermore, Lessig does not discuss any harms that may result 
from remix.  Silencio non est disputandum.
105 This premise is implicit.  It is a particular instantiation of the Millian harm 
principle that is an implication of the utilitarianism that in turn undergirds copyright 
law, at least in its familiar economic form.  See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Joel Feinberg on 
Crime and Punishment:  Exploring the Relationship Between The Moral Limits of the Crimi-
nal Law and The Expressive Function of Punishment, 5 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 162 
(2001) (“[H]arm forms the core of the degree of moral opprobrium . . . we should at-
tach to punishment.”). 
106 This premise is implicit, although it would find much support in copyright case 
law.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 550 n.3 
(1985) (“This equitable rule of reason [fair use] permits courts to avoid rigid applica-
tion of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which 
that law is designed to foster.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
107 Remix culture is more democratic.  LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 25.  Lessig 
states that Read/Write (RW) culture extends itself differently from Read/Only (RO) 
culture. Id. at 28.  He finds that RW culture 
touches social life differently.  It gives the audience something more.  Or bet-
ter, it asks something more of the audience.  It is offered as a draft.  It invites a 
response.  In a culture in which it is common, its citizens develop a kind of 
knowledge that empowers as much as it informs or entertains. 
Id. at 85; see also id. at 92 (“With a practice of writing comes a certain important integ-
rity.”); id. at 130 (“[T]he breadth of this market . . . can’t help but inspire a wider 
range of creators.  For reasons at the core of this book, inspiring more creativity is 
more important than whether you or I like the creativity we’ve inspired.”).  Lessig con-
cludes that “[s]peaking teaches the speaker even if it just makes noise.”  Id. at 132. 
108 See id. at 18 (“Peer-to-peer file sharing is the enemy in the ‘copyright wars.’ . . . 
The war is not about new forms of creativity, not about artists making new art. . . . But 
every war has its collateral damage.  These creators are just one type of collateral dam-
age from this war.”). 
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(2) A nonsensical, unjust, and unintended legal result of some 
other legal goal is unjustified.109
Therefore, criminalizing remix culture is unjustified. 
As the above arguments indicate, the cornerstone premises in Les-
sig’s overall set of arguments—as well as the overall rhetorical posture 
of the book—are that amateur-remix-cultural activity is, under current 
law, criminal activity and that this classification has harmful conse-
quences both to our nation’s youth and to society in general.110  It will 
be beneficial to sort through Lessig’s premises one at a time.  The first 
premise of Argument One is that “[r]emixing is criminal.”111  I will ar-
gue that this key premise is false for the simple yet fundamentally im-
portant reason that significant amounts and types of fan fiction and 
remix culture are fair uses.112  A use that is fair is not an infringe-
ment.113  A use that is not an infringement is a fortiori not criminal.114
109 This premise is implicit. 
110 See The Colbert Report (Comedy Central television broadcast Jan. 8, 2009) (inter-
view with Lawrence Lessig) (discussing Congress’s misplaced priorities in maintaining 
a criminal prohibition on remixing). 
111 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
112 Commentators have taken a range of views on the fair use of fan fiction, fan-
works, and remix culture.  See, e.g., Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 681 (“Fan 
fiction may not be copyrightable, but that does not make it an infringing use any more 
than a book reviewer’s inability to copyright the quotes she uses makes her use un-
fair.”); McCardle, supra note 5, at 445 (“[Y]es, writing fan fiction infringes on copyright 
protections.”); Ranon, supra note 13, at 435 (“Fan fiction qualifies as an unauthorized 
derivative work, and is therefore illegal.” (footnote omitted)); Org. for Transformative 
Works, Frequently Asked Questions:  Why Does the OTW Believe that Transformative 
Works Are Legal?, http://transformativeworks.org/faq (select Legal subsection) (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2009) (“[Copyright] does not preclude the right of others to respond 
to the original work, either with critical commentary, parody, or, we believe, 
transformative works.”); Brad Templeton, Ten Big Myths About Copyright Explained, 
http://www.templetons.com/brad/copymyths.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (“[A]lmost 
all ‘fan fiction’ is arguably a copyright violation.  If you want to publish a story about 
Jim Kirk and Mr. Spock, you need Paramount’s permission, plain and simple.”). 
113 See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is 
not an infringement of copyright.”). 
114 It should also be noted that, although beyond the scope of this Article, even if 
the argument that remix content qualifies as fair use fails, there is a strong argument 
that creators of such content will not be subject to criminal liability under the No Elec-
tronic Theft (NET) Act, which Lessig references in his book.  See 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) 
(2006) (conditioning criminal sanctions for infringement on having “purposes of com-
mercial advantage or private financial gain”); LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 39 (“In 
1997 and 1998, that strategy was implemented in a series of new laws designed to ex-
tend the life of copyrighted work [and] strengthen the criminal penalties for copyright 
infringement . . . .”).  Lessig’s frequent references to the criminalization of a genera-
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Accordingly, a fundamental premise undergirding Lessig’s argument 
for the policy proposal that amateur remix be made legal is false.115
To fully establish that significant forms of remix culture are fair uses 
would require a lengthy fair use analysis that is not results oriented.  A 
comprehensive test of this sort is beyond the scope of the present Ar-
ticle.  Here I will give a streamlined version.  Whereas Lessig wants to 
jettison fair use in favor of full legislation, I will argue for the opposite 
conclusion on the basis of the results of the following fair use test. 
IV. MUCH FAN FICTION AND REMIX ARE FAIR USE
The current fair use test was originally developed by courts but 
was codified as section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976.  It is a four-
factor test that is considered to be equitable in nature and hence fact 
specific.  Factor one of the fair use test looks to the purpose and char-
acter of the use.116  In short, the key features are that much fan fiction 
and remix culture are transformative and noncommercial, thus satisfy-
ing both subfactors of factor one of the fair use test.  The variety and 
creativity of remix culture are truly astounding.117  Henry Jenkins lists 
tion imply a belief that these remixers do, or will, violate the NET Act.  See, e.g., LESSIG,
REMIX, supra note 7, at 283-84 (arguing that children have been branded “pirates” and 
comparing them to Soviet black marketeers).  However, while this statement may be 
correct with respect to file sharing, it should not apply to remix.  First, the NET Act has 
a threshold requiring a retail value of $1000 before criminal liability attaches.  17 
U.S.C. § 506; 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2006).  Remix content will rarely, if ever, attain a value 
of $1000.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B5.3 cmts. 2(A)-(B) (2008) 
(detailing how to calculate retail values).  Second, the statute requires the government 
to prove that there was willful infringement.  17 U.S.C. § 506.  Under the majority view 
of willfulness, which states that a defendant must intend to infringe a copyright, con-
duct is not willful even if a defendant holds an incorrect belief that his actions consti-
tuted fair use.  Eric Goldman, Warez Trading and Criminal Copyright Infringement, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 395, 404-05 (2004) (citing 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 15.02[B][2] (2002)); see also 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) 
(“For purposes of this subsection, evidence of reproduction or distribution of a copy-
righted work, by itself, shall not be sufficient to establish willful infringement . . . .”).  
Consequently, user-generated remix content would not be criminal under the NET 
Act.  In fact, the eighty prosecutions under the NET Act to date have been for acts that 
involve wholesale copying, not remix content.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Intellectual 
Property Cases, http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipcases.html (last visited 
Apr. 15, 2009) (listing major criminal copyright prosecutions). 
115 It is ironic that while Lessig expresses much concern about the deleterious ef-
fects of labeling children criminals, his work may give the false impression that a sig-
nificant proportion of typical remix content is criminal. 
116 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
117 See Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent, supra note 12, at 503 (“[F]anworks have 
expanded from mostly text-based, with occasional graphic art, to include music and 
2009] Social Norms, Fan Fiction, and Remix Culture 1901
ten different kinds of fan fiction.118  A common criticism of many such 
works is that they are of low quality.119  The issue of the quality of the 
work, however, is orthogonal to the issue of transformation, as there 
can be low-quality transformations as well as high-quality ones.  For 
purposes of factor one of the fair use test, what matters is that the use 
is transformative, not that it is a high-quality transformation.120
While this is a common way to think about the test for transforma-
tion, in fact things may be more complicated.  The leading case on 
fair use, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., can be interpreted as prof-
fering two distinct conceptions of transformativeness—one that looks 
to whether a new work sufficiently alters the first, and the other to 
whether it promotes social welfare.121  In the case of fan fiction and 
remix, works will often possess each of these features.  Whether a fan-
video.  These works add new characters, stories, or twists to the existing versions. . . . 
[F]anworks encourage and sustain a vibrant fan community that helps authorized ver-
sions thrive . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
118 Jenkins’s ten categories are (1) recontextualization, (2) expanding the series 
timeline, (3) refocalization, (4) moral realignment, (5) genre shifting, (6) cross overs, 
(7) character dislocation, (8) personalization, (9) emotional intensification, and 
(10) eroticization.  JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS, supra note 6, at 162-77. 
119 See, e.g., ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR 56 (2007) (“Do we really 
need to wade through the tidal wave of amateurish work of authors who have never 
been professionally selected for publication?”). 
120 See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge:  The “Transformativeness” Test for 
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a 
Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 73 (2003) (noting that in Campbell, which “em-
phasized transformativeness as a key element of a copyright fair use analysis, Justice 
Souter cited Justice Holmes’ aesthetic non-discrimination statement with approval, 
noting that the Court, having found a work to be a parody, ‘will not take the further 
step of evaluating its quality’” (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 582-83 (1994))). 
121 The Supreme Court in Campbell stated that 
[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see . . . whether the new work 
merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original creation, or instead adds 
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first 
with new expression, meaning, or message . . . . [T]he goal of copyright, to 
promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of trans-
formative works.  Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright . . . . 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (second alteration in 
original) (citations omitted); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 
1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] search engine provides social benefit by incorporat-
ing an original work into a new work, namely, an electronic reference tool.  Indeed, a 
search engine may be more transformative than a parody because a search engine pro-
vides an entirely new use for the original work, while a parody typically has the same 
entertainment purpose as the original work.”). 
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work is sufficiently creative will, of course, turn on the standard that a 
work must pass to be a new work.  If the test is merely the test for new 
works as applied in the context of originality, or in the context of the 
test of derivative works, the test will be easy to pass, although to some 
extent this will depend on the circuit when it comes to derivative 
works.122  Additionally, in the context of defining a new work for the 
purposes of the originality or the derivative-works test, the test is bi-
nary:  either the work is sufficiently original or it is not.  The fair use 
test, however, is not binary.  Rather, courts are interested in the de-
gree of transformation:  the more transformative the work, the more 
weight that will be given to the consideration of transformative use vis-
à-vis the other factors of the fair use test.  A work that possesses barely 
enough originality to pass the test for a derivative work would not be 
likely to count as transformative in the context of factor one analysis.123
On the other conception, courts make a sort of welfare calculation 
to measure transformative use by considering the social value of the 
use.  It appears that many remix works would pass this test as they cre-
ate social welfare without creating offsetting harms.  For example, in 
the search-engine cases, courts have found the role that the works in 
question play in the functioning of search engines is a transformative 
use that is extremely socially valuable.124
When one thinks of the welfare created by new works, it is com-
mon to think in terms of the welfare that would come through con-
122 Judge Posner has argued in Gracen that the standard for derivative works is 
higher.  See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The re-
quirement of originality is significant chiefly in connection with derivative works, 
where if interpreted too liberally it would paradoxically inhibit rather than promote 
the creation of such works by giving the first creator a considerable power to interfere 
with the creation of subsequent derivative works from the same underlying work.”). 
123 See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 
335 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a Star Trek commentary book contained enough 
original expression to be considered a derivative work but not enough to be consid-
ered transformative for the purposes of the fair use test). 
124 Google’s image search is a classic example: 
It is by now a truism that search engines such as Google Image Search provide 
great value to the public.  Indeed, given the exponentially increasing amounts 
of data on the web, search engines have become essential sources of vital in-
formation for individuals, governments, nonprofits, and businesses who seek 
to locate information.  As such, Google’s use of thumbnails to simplify and 
expedite access to information is transformative of P10’s use of reduced-size 
images to entertain. 
Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 848-49 (C.D. Cal. 2006), rev’d on other 
grounds, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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sumption of the works.125  By this standard, it would appear that a low-
quality work would have a marginal impact on social welfare.  Given 
that much fan fiction and remix are admitted to be of low quality,126
the conclusion would seem to be that much fan fiction and remix add 
little to social welfare.  But the issue is more complicated, as the utility 
impact may pertain not only to fanworks per se but also to the impact 
on the people involved.  For example, Lessig argues that participating 
in remix culture promotes personal integrity.127  Tushnet also points to 
the transformation involved as pertaining to the creator and not to 
the work per se, as does Tony Reese.128  These commentators also 
point to the social benefit of a more diverse creative culture.  Lessig 
argues that greater diversity of remix content will better inspire crea-
tors.129  For Tushnet, the fact that fanworks are motivated by non-
commercial factors and that creators write for niche audiences means 
that a broader array of content will emerge than in a context in which 
creators are motivated solely by monetary rewards.130
125 See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Faulty Math:  The Economics of Legalizing The Grey 
Album, 59 ALA. L. REV. 345, 355 (2008) (“Reduced consumption of copyrighted works 
can . . . generate negative externalities . . . .”). 
126 See, e.g., ANELLI, supra note 77, at 81 (“I . . . found myself staring in horror at a 
one-page story that was so full of sentence fragments, grammatical errors, and narra-
tive interruptions that it looked more like a toddler had been at the page with mag-
netic letters than someone had actually tried to craft prose.  It took a half hour before 
I ran across a piece of fanfiction by an author who respected commas . . . .”); JENKINS,
CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 136 (“Most of what the amateurs create is 
gosh-awful bad . . . .”); LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 92 (“The vast majority of remix, 
like the vast majority of home movies, or consumer photographs, or singing in the 
shower, or blogs, is just crap.”). 
127 See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 92 (“And with a practice of writing [blogs] 
comes a certain important integrity.”). 
128 See R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008) (“[A]ppellate courts also clearly do not view the 
preparation of a derivative work—or any transformation or alteration of a work’s con-
tent—as necessary to a finding that a defendant’s use is transformative.  Instead, courts 
focus on whether the purpose of the defendants’ use is transformative.”); Tushnet, 
User-Generated Discontent, supra note 12, at 504 (“Transformation can also occur when 
someone remakes a work to make it more meaningful to herself and uses it as a lens to 
interpret the world . . . .”).  Post-Campbell, one of the main connections that is made 
between factor one and factor four is that transformative works are more likely to be 
fair uses because, since they are transformative, they are less likely to cause harm.  
Note, however, that if the transformation inquiry is subjective rather than objective, 
this connection may not hold. 
129 LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 42. 
130 See Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent, supra note 12, at 507 (“[N]oncommercial 
creative uses, precisely because they are not motivated by copyright’s profit-based in-
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Once one adopts a welfarist approach to evaluating the purpose 
and character of the use, however, one must be open to purposes that 
may be socially deleterious as well.  A controversial example is por-
nography.131  Both J.K. Rowling and George Lucas, the owners of the 
Harry Potter characters and the Star Wars characters, respectively, have 
explicitly expressed the view that they are particularly opposed to 
pornographic uses of their works by fans.132  These concerns accord 
with a general view that online pornography is harmful to children.133
In the rapidly evolving world of digital remixing technology, these au-
centives, are more likely to contain content that the market would not produce or sus-
tain . . . .”). 
131 Ann Bartow would likely see this as an instance of “pornification” of a sort that 
would be deleterious to the interests of women.  See Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, 
and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 799, 816 (2008) (“Web 2.0 facilitates 
the internet-pornification of anyone who finds herself in front of a camera, voluntarily 
or not . . . .”).  Tushnet, however, implies that pornography is transformative: 
Campbell may be more convincingly read as implying that fan fiction is trans-
formative and thus fair use (and implicitly that fair use protects “new art,” not 
merely work that courts deem socially beneficial). . . . From alternate universes 
to poetry to new adventures to erotica, fan fiction contains much that is “oth-
erwise distinctive.” 
Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 665-66.  It is beyond the scope of the current 
project to decide who has the better argument here.  It is enough for present purposes 
to note that the welfarist interpretation of the transformative use test under Campbell
commits one to taking questions of this sort seriously.  As per the nature of fair use, the 
value accorded to the pornographic content will be fact specific.  Compare Walt Disney 
Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding a pornographic draw-
ing of Disney characters not to be fair use, because the drawings were too similar to the 
originals, but implying that this was not due to the content because “the essence of this 
parody did not focus on how the characters looked, but rather parodied their person-
alities, their wholesomeness and their innocence”), with Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way 
Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 131 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 1981) (“The character of 
the unauthorized use is relevant, but, in the court’s judgment, the fact that this use is 
pornographic in nature does not militate against a finding of fair use.”). 
132 See JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra note 5, at 150 (describing warnings 
by Lucasfilm to fans in the early 1980s not to publish erotic Star Wars stories); E-mail 
from Theodore Goddard, Attorneys for J.K. Rowling, to unnamed Harry Potter fan ( Jan. 
22, 2003), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi?action=image_ 
337 (reprinting a cease-and-desist letter sent to the owner of a website dedicated to 
Harry Potter fan fiction on behalf of Rowling’s literary agency, which expressed concern 
that children might come across the sexually explicit content). 
133 See Robert A. Gomez, Protecting Minors from Online Pornography Without Violating 
the First Amendment:  Mandating an Affirmative Choice, 11 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 
(2007) (noting the action that Congress has taken to protect minors from accessing 
pornography online, including the Communications Decency Act, the Child Online 
Protection Act, and the Children’s Internet Protection Act, and concluding that “there 
is general consensus that pornography has a detrimental effect on impressionable 
youths”). 
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thors could expect to see remixed pornographic content drawing 
from feature-length Harry Potter and Star Wars films.134  Thus, while it is 
fair to conclude that much fan fiction and remix are transformative, 
both because these works contain new forms of expression and be-
cause they are generally productive of social welfare, the logic of a 
welfarist approach to transformative use nevertheless forces the con-
clusion that some works may be transformative yet arguably produc-
tive of disutility. 
The second subfactor of factor one considers whether the use is 
commercial or noncommercial and perhaps educational.135  As seen 
earlier in the discussion of the norm against commercial use, com-
mentators have frequently heralded the noncommercial nature of fan 
fiction as one of its core virtues.136  The same predominantly non-
commercial features pertain to remix culture as well, at least for 
now.137  As noted above, Henry Jenkins has discussed the extent to 
134 See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Note, Must the Children Be Sacrificed:  The Tension Be-
tween Emerging Imaging Technology, Free Speech and Protecting Children, 31 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 406, 410 (2005) (“Celebrities Alyssa Milano and Nancy Kerrigan 
commenced legal action when their heads were morphed by use of digital imaging 
manipulation onto pictures of nude women and placed on commercial Internet sites 
to be gawked at by voyeurs.”); Reinhard W. Wolf, Short Film Remixing on the Inter-
net—Found Footage in the Age of Web 2.0, http://www.shortfilm.de/index.php? 
id=2989&L=2 (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) (“What has long been possible in real life . . . 
is now permeating the world of digital film on the Internet:  the appropriation and re-
cycling of existing material in new combinations. . . . The combination of online tools 
with filesharing is what makes it all possible . . . .”). 
135 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (explaining that the first factor involves examin-
ing “the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commer-
cial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes”).  The definition of fan fiction 
sometimes includes the limitation that it is noncommercial.  See Tushnet, Legal Fictions,
supra note 2, at 655 (defining fan fiction in part as “not produced as ‘professional’ writ-
ing”); Fiesler, supra note 22, at 731-32 (“[F]an fiction is understood to be ‘unauthor-
ized’ and ‘not-for-profit.’”).  Tushnet also defines fanworks as noncommercial for the 
purposes of protection by the Organization for Transformative Works.  Tushnet, User-
Generated Discontent, supra note 12, at 501. 
136 See Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 657-58 (“Fans also see themselves as 
guardians of the texts they love, purer than the owners in some ways because they seek 
no profit.  They believe that their emotional and financial investment in the characters 
gives them moral rights to create with these characters.” (footnote omitted)). 
137 See JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS, supra note 6, at 158 (noting that even as fan 
fiction becomes more prevalent, “fanzines continue to be a mode of amateur, non-
profit publication”); Fiesler, supra note 22, at 748 (describing the “thou shalt not 
profit” rule as a self-enforced constraint on the fan-fiction community). 
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which creators of remix do indeed sometimes seek commercial gain.138
Up to this point, however, such efforts have been relatively insignifi-
cant for a few reasons:  first, due to quality differentials between fan-
works and the commercial works upon which they are built; second, 
because of the norm against commercializing fanworks discussed 
above; and third, out of fear that commercial use might occasion un-
wanted attention from the owners of the underlying works.139  In addi-
tion to being overwhelmingly noncommercial in nature, as noted ear-
lier in the discussion of the first norm, fanworks and remix are 
plausibly characterized as promoting important educational values.140
Because of the dearth of case law involving noncommercial uses, 
fair use analyses in the cases and commentaries have focused over-
whelmingly on the consideration of transformative use.  As a conse-
quence, past discussion of putative fair uses of fan fiction and remix 
has relied too much on analogies to cases such as Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Justin Combs Publishing.141  These cases are inapposite because, al-
though the use at issue in each was not found to be fair, the context 
was commercial.  In Bridgeport, for example, a commercially successful 
musician, P. Diddy, incorporated music samples without authorization 
(or even attribution) and was found to be an infringer.142  I would 
speculate that in a fact pattern similar to Bridgeport but involving a 
one-second sample used by a child performing amateur remix, a court
would almost surely find fair use.143  Moreover, I am willing to speculate 
138 For example, the creators of George Lucas in Love, the Star Wars fan film, were 
motivated at least in part by potential profit. JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, supra
note 5, at 139-43. 
139 See Fiesler, supra note 22, at 749 (noting that most fan-fiction writers are wor-
ried that if anyone begins to profit from the unauthorized works, it will attract the 
negative attention of copyright owners). 
140 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
141 507 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2007). 
142 Id. at 475.  Lessig notes the oddity of the fact that a student can quote He-
mingway in an essay, but cannot do the equivalent in the remix context with a film 
based on Hemingway’s text.  LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 53-54.  He uses Bridgeport
to support his claim that a parallel ability to quote is not available in an audio context.  
Id. at 104. 
143 Lessig downplays the distinction between commercial and noncommercial uses: 
 At this point, some will resist the way I’ve carved up the choices.  They will 
insist that the distinction is not between text on the one hand and 
film/music/images on the other.  Instead, the distinction is between commer-
cial or public presentations of text/film/music/images on the one hand, and 
private or noncommercial use of text/film/music/images on the other. . . . 
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that a court would find such a use to be fair even if the use was mar-
ginally transformative.  In other words, the consideration of non-
commercial use is a potentially powerful fair use factor that has gener-
ally gone underappreciated due to a dearth of cases presenting such 
uses. 
Following Campbell, courts have noted the inverse relationship be-
tween transformative uses and the factor four consideration of harm 
to the market caused by the unauthorized work—the more transfor-
mative a work is, the less likely it is for market harm to ensue because 
the works are increasingly dissimilar and thus less likely to serve the 
same market.144  Note that a parallel case can be made that the less 
commercial a work is, the less likely it is to hurt the market for the 
underlying work that it uses without authorization.  The lower risk of 
market harm means the work is more likely to be a fair use. 
Combining the two subfactors of factor one, we see that typical 
remix is both transformative and noncommercial, and often educa-
tional to boot.  Given that factor one is the most important of the four 
 Yet however sensible that distinction might seem, it is in fact not how the 
rules are being enforced just now . . . . And in fact, Disney has complained 
about kids at a kindergarten painting Mickey on a wall.  And in a setup by J. D. 
Lasica, every major studio except one insisted that a father has no right to in-
clude a clip of a major film in a home movie—even if that movie is never 
shown to anyone except the family—without paying thousands of dollars to do so. 
LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 55 (footnote omitted).  Lessig later analogizes to jazz 
musicians and their tolerated practice of improvising on works of others and argues 
that a parallel, modern art form, music mashups, should similarly be tolerated:  “Why 
should it be effectively impossible for an artist from Harlem practicing the form of art 
of the age to commercialize his creativity because the costs of negotiating and clearing 
the rights here are so incredibly high?”  Id. at 105.  In other words, remix artists should 
be able to commercialize their creativity.  Id.; see also id. at 255 (“There should be a 
broad swath of freedom for professionals to remix existing copyrighted work . . . .”). 
144 Campbell notes that 
when a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an 
original, it clearly ‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original and serves as a 
market replacement for it, making it likely that cognizable market harm to the 
original will occur.  But when, on the contrary, the second use is transforma-
tive, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not be so 
readily inferred. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted); see also, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 176 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Campbell explains that the market effect must be evaluated in light of whether the 
secondary use is transformative.”); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 
F.3d 132, 145 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The more transformative the secondary use, the less 
likelihood that the secondary use substitutes for the original.”). 
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factors, the above considerations weigh heavily in favor of the charac-
terization of works of fan fiction and remix as fair uses. 
Factor two of the fair use test centers on “the nature of the copy-
righted work.”145  With regard to factor two, most fan fiction and remix 
culture draw from unauthorized works that are published, which fa-
vors the putative fair user.146  Typically, however, these works are crea-
tive as opposed to factual in nature.147  This counts against fair use.148
In such instances, when the factor two subfactors point in opposite di-
rections, courts typically find that factor two disfavors fair use.149  Thus, 
factor two typically will not find fan fiction and remix to be fair uses.  
Courts, however, have typically characterized factor two as the least 
important of the fair use factors.150
Factor three centers on “the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”151  With re-
gard to factor three, there is no typical case—some fan fiction and 
remix draw heavily from the underlying works, either quantitatively or 
145 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006). 
146 See Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 677 (“The published/unpublished 
distinction of the second factor is instructive.  The fan community exists in large part 
because people have been invited to watch television shows free of charge.”); 
McCardle, supra note 5, at 458 ("As a preliminary matter, fan fiction authors should 
note that while fictional works inherently receive greater protection, fictional works are 
also usually in wide distribution, thereby bolstering a fair use argument."). 
147 See Tushnet, Legal Fictions, supra note 2, at 676-77 (“Under the second fair use 
factor, fictional sources get more protection than facts.  Like parody, though, fan fic-
tion is unlikely to be written about factual narratives . . . .”). 
148 See id. at 677 (“This factor supports giving less protection to a work that had 
been broadly distributed, because such works are at the other end of the continuum 
from closely-held works.”). 
149 See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563-65 
(1985) (analyzing both the fact-based and unpublished nature of the work and finding 
the use “difficult to characterize as ‘fair’”); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256-57 (2d 
Cir. 2006) (noting that the original work was both published and creative and that 
therefore the second fair use factor did favor the copyright holder, even if the factor 
ultimately did not carry much weight in the fair use analysis).  For a more detailed 
analysis, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–
2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 615 n.215 (2008), in which Professor Beebe discusses the 
interplay between the creative/factual inquiry and the published/unpublished inquiry, 
including how to proceed when the two subfactors point in opposite directions. 
150 See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright?  Aligning Incentives with Reality by Us-
ing Creative Motivation To Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (“While 
the Supreme Court has indicated that all four factors must be considered and no pre-
sumptions should be employed, it has become clear in the case law that often the first 
and fourth factors dominate the analysis, with the third and second factors trailing in 
significance, in that order.” (footnote omitted)). 
151 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). 
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qualitatively (or both), while other works draw relatively little from the 
underlying works and add much that is creative and original.  All else 
equal, the former category of works will count in favor of the owner 
while the latter will count in favor of the user.  While factor three will 
count against users in many cases, this factor is not dispositive against 
fair use.  Once again, following Campbell, courts and commentators 
have often noted that when a work is sufficiently transformative, a use 
may be fair despite the fact that a complete copy of the work is used 
without permission.152  In the well-known Air Pirates case, however, the 
court found that defendants had taken too much to be justified by the 
other factors, including the transformative nature of the work.153  It 
cannot be taken for granted that the consideration of transformative 
use will always trump factor three considerations. 
Courts and commentators have tended to talk almost exclusively 
about the tradeoff between factor one analysis and factor three analy-
sis in terms of the transformativeness of a use versus the amount and 
substantiality of the portion of the underlying work that is used.  Once 
again, this is a consequence of the fact that this tradeoff has typically 
arisen in cases involving commercial uses.154  In the context of amateur 
remix, the question is different because the fact patterns, were they to 
be litigated, would involve noncommercial uses.  In such instances, 
the factor one subfactor of noncommercial use together with the 
transformative element of the use would be set off against the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used.  All else equal, in an amateur-
remix context, the noncommercial nature of the fanwork will require 
less transformation than would otherwise be necessary to offset the 
factor three consideration of the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used.  In addition, it is reasonable to suppose that the more non-
152 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 
(1984) (“[T]he fact that the entire work is reproduced does not [in certain circum-
stances] have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use.” (citation 
omitted)); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 587 (1994) (citing 
Sony for the same proposition). 
153 Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is our 
view that defendants took more than is allowed even under the Berlin test as applied to 
both the conceptual and physical aspects of the characters.”). 
154 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-88 (1994) (discussing the tradeoff in the con-
text of commercial songs); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 
1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing this tradeoff in the case of commercial novels); Len-
non v. Premise Media Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 310, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (discussing this 
tradeoff in a context in which the transformative use was “at least partially commercial 
in nature”). 
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commercial a work is, the less likely a court would be to treat factor 
three as a weighty consideration. 
There is reason to believe that as we move from a world of fan fic-
tion to a world of remix, factor three will play a more important role 
in influencing fair use outcomes in a direction unfavorable to fair use.  
We can reasonably predict that the amount taken will be a function of 
technology, such that as it becomes less costly to make digital copies of 
large files such as feature-length films, more people can be predicted 
to make full-length copies of unauthorized works their starting point.  
Compare this to fan fiction, in which the creator takes the ideas of the 
characters and then does all the writing of the new story on her own.  
The former sorts of uses are more likely to lead to market harm and 
thus are less likely to be fair uses. 
For instance, if one reads a random sampling of the many thou-
sands of fan-fiction works written using Harry Potter characters, they 
are typically of such low quality from a market perspective that they 
pose absolutely no threat to the market for the original.  The opposite 
is true, however, if one starts from a complete digital copy and re-
moves very little.  The resulting work will be more likely to have com-
mercial value because the work remains largely the original, which 
presumably has commercial value.  If one begins with a few characters 
and adds very little, one is staring at blank pages.  But if one takes a 
complete digital copy and does very little to transform it, one is not 
looking at a blank page but instead at a work that very closely resem-
bles the original. 
Indeed, the parallel to what is now possible with newly released 
feature films would be for a fan-fiction writer to start with a complete 
digital copy of the book and begin to winnow it down from there.  
Thus, instead of taking characters and writing a new story around 
them, an amateur remixer might instead take the complete book and 
write in an extra character, take out some foul language, or change 
some of the words.  For example, many older novels and movies use 
language that is racist or sexist by contemporary standards.  Often it is 
only a few words in a whole book or movie.  One can easily imagine 
fans making minor changes to complete digital books, then uploading 
them to file-sharing sites.  The possibilities seem endless. 
Consider my favorite novelist, Cormac McCarthy.  In The Border 
Trilogy, some of his characters speak in Spanish and the author does 
not provide translations.155  Now imagine if someone made a digital 
155 See generally CORMAC MCCARTHY, THE BORDER TRILOGY (1999). 
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copy of the book and changed it only by adding footnotes or paren-
thetical notes in which the dialogue were translated.156
In sum, then, it is likely to be significant to fair use that it is now 
much easier to make full digital copies because it is much more likely 
that fanworks and remix will originate from complete copies and get 
winnowed down from there.  As we have seen, this important change 
is captured by the parts of the fair use test that look to market harm 
and to the amount and substantiality of the portion taken.  Just as fac-
tor one is tied to factor four in that highly transformative works and 
noncommercial works will tend not to cause market harm,157 the above 
discussion highlights the important connection between factors three 
and four.  Other things equal, the more that is taken from the original 
and the more substantial the part taken, the more likely there is to be 
market harm as a result of market substitution.158  This effect is much 
more likely when the creator begins from a full copy of the work as 
compared to taking a snippet to use as a small part of a larger whole.  
Thus, better technology is in tension with fair use in this respect. 
Factor four considers whether the unauthorized use will harm the 
market for the original work.159  Particularly relevant in the context of 
fan fiction and remix is the fact that courts consider harm to the de-
rivative-works market as well as to the market for the original.  As the 
discussion above indicates, because a significant amount of fan-fiction 
and remix works are transformative and noncommercial, they will not 
harm the market for the owner’s original work.160  A more difficult 
question is whether these works hurt the market for derivative works.  
Not all possible derivative-works markets are protected; rather, only 
156 The Border Trilogy consists of three novels:  The Crossing, All the Pretty Horses, and 
Cities of the Plain.
157 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
158 Indeed, the Campbell Court stated that
whether “a substantial portion of the infringing work was copied verbatim” 
from the copyrighted work is a relevant question, for it may reveal a dearth of 
transformative character or purpose under the first factor, or a greater likeli-
hood of market harm under the fourth; a work composed primarily of an 
original, particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to 
be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original. 
510 U.S. at 587-88 (citation omitted) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Na-
tion Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565 (1985)). 
159 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006). 
160 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984) 
(“If the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed.  But if 
it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.”). 
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those that are reasonably likely to be exploited by owners are pro-
tected.161  This limitation favors amateur creators, as fanworks and re-
mixes are often idiosyncratic to the particular creator and hence not 
geared toward a commercial market. 
There is a second point to note that may also work in favor of 
amateur creators, and perhaps especially creators of remix as com-
pared to traditional fan fiction.  Contrary to the implicit suggestion of 
some commentary, not all fan fiction and remix are likely to count as 
derivative works.  Derivative works are “recast, transformed, or 
adapted” from the original.162  This characterization will be true for 
many works built on top of the original works such that the original 
works—or elements thereof, such as key characters—remain recog-
nizable, maintaining a substantial presence in the new work.  These 
sorts of works are plausibly characterized as recasting, transforming, 
or adapting the original and thus may expose the creator to allega-
tions of infringement. 
In other instances, however, it is not appropriate to characterize 
the new work as “derivative” of the original.  For example, music 
mashups are an important category of remix.  Mashup artists often use 
large numbers of unauthorized works in the process of creating their 
music.  For example, the remixer, working under the name Girl Talk, 
uses dozens of unauthorized snippets.163  It cannot plausibly be 
claimed that the new work is a recasting, adaptation, or transforma-
tion of all or even one of these works.  This feature should benefit re-
mix when it comes to fair use, as fewer of these works can be consid-
ered derivative.  Accordingly, they cannot colorably be alleged to 
violate the derivative-works right. 
Having considered each of the four factors in the fair use test, the 
next step is to balance them.  We saw that much fan fiction and remix 
culture will prevail on 3½ out of 4 of the fair use factors, including the 
two that courts consider most important, factors one and four.  Gen-
erally speaking, then, fan fiction and remix are fair uses.  To be clear, 
my claim is that these uses are fair presently—not just in some coun-
terfactual world in which a court performs a fair use test.  I state this 
161 See id. at 592 (“The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that 
creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.”). 
162 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
163 See Rob Walker, Mash-Up Model, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 20, 2008, at 15 (noting 
that Girl Talk’s newest collection of songs “is composed almost entirely of more than 
200 samples of other artists’ music, ranging from Lil Wayne to Kenny Loggins—none 
of which [Girl Talk] has obtained permission to use”). 
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in the Holmesian sense—that law is the best prediction of what judges 
will do.164  My claim is that because judges presented with most exam-
ples of fan fiction and remix—as they have existed thus far—would 
find such uses to be fair, these uses are fair now. 
Not all fan-fiction and remix works, however, are fair uses.  While 
a lack of harm to the original work may be characteristic of fan fiction 
and remix currently, two important qualifications remain relevant.  
First, some amateur remixes may pose significant threats to the mar-
ket for the original if they use too much of the work in proportion to 
the amount of transformative change.  Second, we cannot rely on 
static analysis because the sorts of works that we are likely to see in the 
future will in part be determined by the form of regulation of fan fic-
tion and remix that is adopted.  Of particular relevance is the fact that 
if amateur remix were to be made legal, we could expect to see an in-
crease in the sorts of works that are likely to harm the owner’s market 
for the original (despite the noncommercial nature of the fanwork).  
We see then that while there may be a vast number of fair uses, there 
may be a significant number of unfair uses as well.  This fact will come 
into play further along in my overall argument.  For present purposes, 
what matters is the overall finding that much fan fiction and remix 
constitute fair use. 
Recall why we engaged in the preceding fair use analysis in the 
first place.  The fact of large-scale fair use goes directly toward refut-
ing Premise One of Lessig’s first argument, namely that remixing is 
criminal.165  A use that is fair is not an infringement.  A use that is not 
an infringement is a fortiori not a criminal infringement.  Accord-
ingly, Premise One of Argument One, which is the fundamental claim 
undergirding Lessig’s book, is shown to be false. 
It is striking how little Lessig says about fair use, although it is 
perhaps understandable in a work that has a polemical bent.  By ac-
knowledging that fair use is a viable possibility for remix works, one 
begs the question as to which remix works are fair and therefore not 
criminal.  This in turn begs the further question as to whether fair use 
doctrine may provide adequate protection for amateur remix, thus 
obviating the need for the dramatic policy proposal Lessig proffers. 
164 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 
(1897) (“[A] legal duty so called is nothing but a prediction that if a man does or 
omits certain things he will be made to suffer . . . by judgment of the court . . . .”). 
165 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
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Lessig does make some remarks about fair use in passing, from 
which it is clear that he takes a dim view of fair use as a viable doctrine 
in the context of remix.  Lessig writes, “Once triggered, the law re-
quires either a license or a valid claim of ‘fair use.’  Licenses are 
scarce; defending a claim of ‘fair use’ is expensive.  By default, RW use 
violates copyright law.  RW culture is thus presumptively illegal.”166
While the logic of this argument is not crystal clear, Lessig’s claim 
seems to be that because amateurs cannot afford to establish fair use, 
they are infringers—or rather, presumptive infringers—as their ac-
tions are “presumptively illegal.”167
This argument is a non sequitur.  Users are fairly characterized as 
infringers only when their use, if evaluated by a court, would fail the 
fair use test.  If one is a fair user and is sued, one will, for all practical 
purposes, be equivalent to an infringer in the sense that one will typi-
cally not be able to establish one’s fair use status for monetary reasons 
and thus will lose by default.  This, however, does not make one an in-
fringer—or even a presumptive infringer—but rather a fair user who 
is not in a position, practically speaking, to vindicate one’s legal rights.  
Needless to say, it is sensible to question the value of such rights or the 
regulatory regime that fails to give these rights more practical support.
But these are different questions from the ones before us regarding 
whether such uses are fair.  We saw above that the vast preponderance 
of them are. 
It is convenient to conceptualize my point in terms of possible-
world semantics, as this helps to clarify what it means to talk about fair 
use in a context in which there is no established case law, so as to pro-
vide a better indication of the legal status of various uses.168  Possible-
world semantics allows for a meaningful difference between talking 
about case results as precedent and considering the status of fair use as a 
matter of prediction in a world without precedent.  We must distinguish 
between two different sets of possible worlds.  In one set, litigants ac-
tually go to court and a fair use determination is produced.  Based on 
the fair use analysis provided in the previous Part, my claim is that, in 
these worlds, most amateur fan-fiction writers and remixers are found 
to be fair users.  In the second set of possible worlds, overbearing 
commercial owners harass fair users such that, for practical reasons, 
166 LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 100. 
167 Id.
168 See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY 15-20 (1980) (explaining 
and defending the use of possible-world semantics). 
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they stop their use voluntarily or default in a lawsuit.  In such worlds, 
many potential users would never attempt to undertake fair use in the 
first place, due to the chilling effect of previous actions taken by own-
ers against fair users.169  What is most important about this second set 
of possible worlds is that courts do not produce fair use case law.  In 
these worlds, the uses are never actually held to be unfair, as there is 
simply no legal determination on the merits.  Losing a lawsuit by de-
fault does not turn a fair use into an unfair use. 
Lessig claims that remix is “presumptively illegal.”170  However, he 
fails to explain what this claim entails.  The passive tense of the state-
ment begs the question as to who is presuming the illegality.  If he is 
referring to those worlds where owners intimidate fair users, there is 
no presumption of illegality.  While the users themselves would feel 
that owners have treated them unfairly, this feeling—quite the oppo-
site of a presumption of illegality—is a reflection of the fact that the 
users will have a belief, implicit or explicit, that their use is fair. 
Perhaps more significantly, there is no reason to think that the 
owners would make such a presumption.  If commercial owners have 
good lawyers, these lawyers should be able to dispassionately predict 
what a court would be inclined to find with regard to fair use.  If I am 
right that most fan fiction and remix are fair use, then one would ex-
pect owners’ lawyers to reach this conclusion as well—at least if they 
are worth their salt.  Of course, this would not necessarily preclude 
owners from harassing amateur creators, as they might nevertheless 
conclude that doing so was the best legal or business strategy. 
For the sake of comprehensiveness, we should ask whether anyone 
else in this set of worlds is presuming illegality.  The courts surely are 
not, because given our definition of the set of related possible worlds 
under consideration, the fair users are practically prevented from 
seeking to legally vindicate their fair use claims.  Consequently, courts 
are not even made aware of the dispute, and they are certainly not in a 
position to develop a specific legal opinion regarding fair use—
namely, that it is presumptively illegal. 
169 In addition to deterrence based on actions against other users, the uncertainty 
inherent in the fair use doctrine can have a serious chilling effect on potential fair us-
ers, particularly considering the wide array of possible remedies for copyright owners 
and the lack of a meaningful method for determining which uses fall under the doc-
trine.  See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1483 (2007) (suggesting that because of overdeterrence and uncertainty, fair 
use should be reformed to recognize certain types of copying as per se fair). 
170 LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 100; see also supra note 166 and accompanying text. 
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Summing up the preceding discussion, it is simply a mistake to 
think that because some party is not in a position to vindicate a legal 
right, the party no longer has that right.  So too, if an unauthorized 
use is fair, it remains so even if the user is not benefited from the right 
to this use because the party is either intimidated or otherwise practi-
cally disabled from exercising the right.  Thus, we see that it is incor-
rect to think that remix is presumptively illegal. 
This important legal principle was recently clarified in Lenz v. 
Universal Music Corp.,171 a rare case involving amateur remix.  This case 
gained a great deal of media attention because it was yet another in-
stance in which the commercial copyright industry took legal action 
against a particularly sympathetic plaintiff for an act that, while tech-
nically a colorable instance of infringement, nevertheless appears to
the common person to be harmless.172  The facts of the case, in short, 
are that an eighteen-month-old child spontaneously began dancing to 
a Prince song while his mother recorded the performance on video; 
she later posted the clip to YouTube.173  Universal filed a takedown no-
tice pursuant to the DMCA, the mother objected,174 and the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation took the case pro bono after the situation gained 
attention.175  Lessig begins the introduction to his book with the facts 
of this case.176  He contrasts them with what he calls a “fair and justi-
fied” use of the law, one in which a media company might, for exam-
ple, demand the takedown of a “new television series with high-priced 
ads.”177  Lessig argues that in the Lenz case, the use of the law was nei-
ther fair nor justified because the Prince song in Lenz’s video was 
something completely different: 
First, the quality of the recording was terrible.  No one would download 
Lenz’s video to avoid paying Prince for his music.  Likewise, neither 
Prince nor Universal was in the business of selling the right to video-cam 
your baby dancing to their music.  There is no market in licensing music 
171 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
172 See, e.g., Op-Ed, Prince and the Toddler; Should Copyright Law Apply to a YouTube 
Video of a Baby Dancing to ‘Let’s Go Crazy’?, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 2008, at A20 (“There 
should be some deterrent against copyright holders attacking fair uses online . . . .”); 
Timothy B. Lee, Fair Use Gets a Fair Shake:  YouTube Tot To Get Day in Court, ARS TECH-
NICA, Aug. 21, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/08/fair-use-gets-a-
fair-shake-youtube-tot-to-get-day-in-court.ars (praising the Lenz decision). 
173 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52. 
174 Id. at 1152. 
175 Lee, supra note 172. 
176 LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 1-5. 
177 Id. at 2. 
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to amateur video.  Thus, there was no plausible way in which Prince or 
Universal was being harmed by Stephanie Lenz’s sharing this video of 
her kid dancing with her family, friends, and whoever else saw it.
178
Lessig brushes aside discussion of any further details of the case, 
noting that there will be “plenty of time to consider the particulars of 
a copyright claim like this in the pages that follow.”179  Instead, Lessig 
shifts to his larger point: 
What is it that allows these lawyers and executives to take a case like this 
seriously, to believe there’s some important social or corporate reason to 
deploy the federal scheme of regulation called copyright to stop the 
spread of these images and music?  “Let’s Go Crazy?”  Indeed!  What has 
brought the American legal system to the point that such behavior by a 
leading corporation is considered anything but “crazy”?  Or to put it the 
other way around, who have we become that such behavior seems sane 
to anyone?
180
What Lessig does not discuss, however, is that this case is a coun-
terexample to his basic thesis about the criminality of amateur remix.  
In fact, this dramatic opening to the book is like Hamlet without the 
Prince (no pun intended).  The real meaning of the case is precisely 
the opposite of that which Lessig implies by the manner in which he 
represents the case.  Lenz disputed the infringement claim, asserting 
fair use, and then sued Universal for submitting a takedown request to 
YouTube without first making a good-faith effort to determine 
178 Id. at 2-3. 
179 Id. at 4.  As it turns out, however, there is no discussion in the rest of the book 
of a case of remix in which Lessig discusses either fair use or allegations of criminal 
conduct. 
180 Id. at 4-5.  Lessig might charitably have noted that Prince is well known for be-
ing zealous in protecting against unauthorized uses of his works.  See, e.g., David 
Bauder, Singer Sues Web Sites, Claiming Bootlegging, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 15, 1999, at 41 
(discussing lawsuits filed in 1999 by Prince against several websites and magazines for 
unauthorized use of his music, photographs, and the symbol designating his name); 
Owen Gibson, Purple Pain Prince Threatens To Sue His Fans over Online Images, GUARDIAN
(London), Nov. 7, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/ 
nov/07/musicnews.topstories3; Mike Collett-White, Prince To Sue YouTube, eBay over 
Music Use, REUTERS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSL1364328420070914 (discussing Prince’s intention to “‘reclaim his art on the 
Internet’” by suing sites like YouTube, eBay, and Pirate Bay); Jake Coyle, Radiohead to 
Prince:  Unblock ‘Creep’ Cover Videos, USA TODAY, May 30, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/2008-05-30-prince_N.htm (discussing Radio-
head’s desire to have YouTube unblock a video, which Prince had gotten removed, of 
Prince covering one of their songs). 
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whether the use was fair (and hence authorized under the law).181
Lenz survived Universal’s motion to dismiss,182 establishing an impor-
tant precedent that has the potential to strongly promote the ability of 
amateur remixers to show their works.  After Lenz, it will no longer be 
enough for the owner of an underlying work to file a takedown de-
mand based simply on the fact that some amount of her work was 
used in a remix.  An owner filing a takedown notice must represent 
that she has a good-faith belief that the use is not a fair use.183  Given 
the fair use analysis provided above, showing that much remix is fair 
use, the obvious but important implication is that there will be much 
remix for which commercial owners of underlying works will not be 
able to make good-faith representations of infringement.  This means, 
in turn, that there should be a drop in the DMCA takedown notices 
filed by owners such as Universal, particularly for those cases in which 
the use is fair and the owner would otherwise have been able to pre-
vail simply because of the asymmetry in power and resources between 
corporate owners and amateur remixers.  After Lenz, taking such ac-
tions, if not well supported in terms of fair use analysis, may subject an 
owner to a finding of misrepresentation under the DMCA.184  The end 
result is that this case is strongly supportive of the fair use rights of 
amateur remixers. 
Consider one final thought on fair use.  Lessig argues that fair use 
is too complex for ordinary people to apply,185 the implication being 
that legislation will provide a bright-line rule now lacking under fair 
use analysis.  This problem is not solved by making amateur remixes 
181 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(“On July 24, 2007, Lenz filed suit against Universal alleging misrepresentation pursu-
ant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) and tortious interference with her contract with YouTube.”). 
182 Id. at 1157. 
183 See id. at 1156 (“A good faith consideration of whether a particular use is fair 
use is consistent with the purpose of the statute.”). 
184 See id. at 1154-55 (“An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by 
issuing a takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is 
sufficient to state a misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the 
DMCA.”).
185 Lessig contends that if the law is going to regulate children, it should do so in a 
manner that is understandable to them.  See LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 7, at 266-67 
(“[W]hen copyright law purports to regulate everyone with a computer . . . then there 
is a special obligation to make sure this regulation is clear.”); see also Posting of Tim 
Armstrong to Info/Law, U.S. Government:  Fair Use Is Too Complex To Explain to 
Kids, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2007/08/10/us-government-fair-use-is-too-
complex-to-explain-to-kids (Aug. 10, 2007) (discussing various governmental attempts 
to explain copyright law to minors and nonlawyers). 
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legal, however, as creators will still need to engage fair use law to the 
extent that their use may implicate other copyrights.  In other words, 
Lessig’s proposal will not achieve the bright line to which he aspires.  
To see this, imagine a type of use that is likely to be common if ama-
teur remix is made legal:  the CleanFlicks model of digitizing a movie 
and then deleting violent and sexually explicit scenes.186  An example 
of such a use would be the movie Titanic without the scene of Kate 
Winslet topless.  Were the owner unable to sue for violations of its 
right to derivative works because amateur remix were legal, the owner 
would sue under the theory that the “clean” Titanic was an unauthor-
ized copy.  The defendant would then proffer a fair use defense, 
claiming this use as a transformative remix.  There is no reason, how-
ever, that a transformative work cannot also constitute an infringing 
“copy” as this term is understood in its technical, legal sense.187  Con-
sider a paradigm case in copyright law, Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures In-
dustries, Inc.188  In that case, the defendant produced a poster to pro-
mote the film Moscow on the Hudson, which the court held was an 
unauthorized use of the plaintiff’s well-known New Yorker cover.189
While the poster was clearly a transformative derivative work, it was 
also successfully alleged to involve elements of exact copying.190  Thus, 
even if Lessig gets his desired statutory change, ordinary users will still 
need to be able to distinguish remixes that involve making illicit cop-
ies of the originals from those that do not.  The determining factor in 
this issue will typically involve the fair use test.  Thus, fair use doc-
trine—with all its vagaries—cannot be avoided after all.191  In other 
186 See Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 
(D. Colo. 2006) (describing the process by which CleanFlicks deletes “sex, nudity, pro-
fanity and gory violence” from movies and redistributes them (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (granting the owner of a copyright the exclusive 
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies”). 
188 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
189 Id. at 708-09. 
190 See id. at 713-14 (finding copyright infringement even where “not all of the de-
tails are identical” because all that is needed is “a substantial similarity that involves 
only a small portion of each work” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
191 The claim that fair use doctrine is unusually imprecise, while often stated, is 
nevertheless subject to serious doubt.  See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses,
77 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 3), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323834 (arguing that fair use is actually “more co-
herent and more predictable” than most commentators have suggested and that fair 
use cases typically fall into “policy-relevant clusters” that make it possible to predict 
whether a use would be considered fair). 
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words, Lessig must acknowledge that producers of remix culture will 
not be able to avoid fair use because any putative user has to deter-
mine if making the transformative remix or derivative work also in-
volves the making of a fair use copy with regard to the remix qua copy.
Let us bring the discussion back to Lessig’s Argument One.  The 
above discussion demonstrated that Lessig’s first premise, that remix-
ing is criminal,192 is false.  Lessig might retort that the truth of my ar-
gument does not gainsay the fact that some children—namely, those 
that create remixes that are not fair uses—are criminals by virtue of 
their activities.  Accordingly, we can substitute for Premise One of Ar-
gument Two the assertion that some children are criminals in light of 
their remix activities.193  This would affect the conclusion of Argument 
Two in that the word “some” would have to be inserted in front of 
“our children” in the conclusion as well.  This would still be an impor-
tant conclusion if true.  It is not true, however, because the second 
premise of Argument Two is false.  The second premise claims that 
because remix is criminal, making children criminals will lead to dis-
respect for the law and more criminal activity.194  This premise implic-
itly relies on an assumption of perfect information.  In fact, the oppo-
site is true.  It is not well known that such activities would be criminal.  
Unless one was specifically knowledgeable regarding intellectual 
property law, one would not know whether an unauthorized remix, 
when not a fair use and willful, is criminal.  Indeed, this claim is plau-
sible for precisely the sort of reason Lessig would support:  such a rule 
is extremely counterintuitive. 
Because such a rule is so equitably counterintuitive that one would 
not expect it to exist, it cuts against the grain of Lessig’s larger argu-
ment.  Consistently with the considerations already touched on above, 
if people are not told that a certain behavior is criminal, people are 
not charged with a crime following civil lawsuits, and prosecutors re-
sponsible for enforcing crimes never prosecute, then the claim that 
children are suffering the negative effects of being labeled criminals 
cannot be true.  Not only are young remix artists not labeled criminals 
(except by Lessig), but they also receive information that would lead 
them reasonably to conclude the opposite.  Consider the impact of 
social-networking sites like YouTube or MySpace.  When kids go to 
these sites, they find large numbers of amateur videos, many of which 
192 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
193 For a discussion of Argument Two, see supra Part III. 
194 See supra text accompanying note 100. 
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remix from commercial sources to some extent.  From this fact, it 
would be natural to conclude, if only implicitly, that such videos are 
not criminal.  These sites are not on the fringes of mainstream cul-
ture—quite the opposite—yet no one is shutting down YouTube or 
telling children not to upload videos to it. 
Indeed, as we saw above, there are strong social norms supporting 
remix.  Lessig’s second argument implicitly depends on a general so-
cial understanding that remix activity is criminal activity and likely to 
serve as a gateway crime.  We have seen, however, that much remix is 
not criminal in the first place, and to the extent that it is an infringe-
ment and thus potentially criminal, this fact is completely unknown to 
people and thus will not lead to the felonious downstream conse-
quences that Lessig predicts. 
Amateur remix and fan fiction do not fit the typical profile of a 
gateway crime.  For example, one common element of a gateway 
crime is the presence of a social dimension, such that by taking part in 
the gateway crime, one begins to associate with a new group of people 
who themselves are already engaged in a wider array of criminal activi-
ties.195  By associating with such a group, one would naturally be ex-
posed to more criminal socialization and opportunities than would 
otherwise be the case.  However, fan fiction and remix do not involve 
this social dimension.  These acts of amateur creation have no ten-
dency to bring children into greater contact with criminals.  Thus, we 
can conclude that the second premise of Argument Two is false; its 
conclusion is thus left unsupported. 
The fair use of significant amounts of remix works also affects 
Premise One of Argument Three.196  In this argument, Lessig claims 
that institutions of literacy will be deterred from teaching the sorts of 
skills that would promote the flowering of remix culture.  He offers 
almost no direct support for this claim, however.  Rather, it is pre-
sented in conclusory fashion, apparently from the implicit premises 
that remix is criminal and that schools, by their nature, do not teach 
criminal activities.197
Lessig’s argument is faulty for both conceptual and empirical rea-
sons.  Consider the most compelling conceptual reason first.  The 
195 See Stephen Pudney, The Road to Ruin?  Sequences of Initiation to Drugs and Crime 
in Britain, 113 ECON. J. C182, C183 (2003) (noting that one of the causes of the “gate-
way effect” is social interaction—for example, meeting people one would not otherwise 
have met). 
196 See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
197 See id.
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skills that one needs to be a criminal remixer are exactly the same as 
those that one needs to be a professional remixer working at places 
like Pixar or Disney.  One cannot teach students one set of skills with-
out teaching them the other, as there is really only one set.  Obviously, 
art and design schools would by their nature consider it part of their 
core mission to teach students the skills that they need to qualify for 
employment.  For commercial content companies, the shift to digital 
is a fait accompli at this point, and it would therefore be highly sur-
prising if students were not learning to create and manipulate digital 
content.  Indeed, without education in digital design, what else would 
these students be learning?  Moreover, because much remix is fair use 
and thus legal, schools have an additional reason to teach these skills.  
The icing on the cake is the fact that in educational settings in par-
ticular, unauthorized uses are more likely to be fair.198  Thus, it should 
be no surprise that these arguments, rather than Lessig’s, are borne 
out by the facts on the ground where remix is widely taught.199
Argument Four contains four premises.  The only one that I con-
test is the first premise—that remixes cause no harm.200  While Prem-
ise One is false, Premise Two appears unproblematic.  Premise Two 
simply states that creative practices that cause no harm should not be 
impeded by the law.201  This premise is unobjectionable to a whole 
range of normative views that assume that one is free to do as one 
wishes as long as there is no issue of countervailing harms to others.  
This is the famous harm principle that is at the core of consequential-
ist jurisprudence.202  Nor is Premise Three—which states that creative 
198 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (providing that “the purpose and character of the 
use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educa-
tional purposes,” should be considered among other factors in determining whether a 
use is fair and therefore not a copyright infringement). 
199 See, e.g., Berkeley Ctr. for New Media, Spring 2009 Recommended Courses:  
Mixing and Remixing Information, http://bcnm.berkeley.edu/pages/courses-s09 (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2009) (“This course focuses on employing XML and web services to 
reuse or remix digital content and services.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Hyde Park Art Ctr., Youth Courses:  Digital Mix Up, http://www.hydeparkart.org/ 
school-studio/youth-courses/digital_media/digital_mix_up (last visited Apr. 15, 2009) 
(“Students in this class will be able to dabble in various digital projects including video, 
digital photo, digitally creating music, creating video montages, slide shows and more.”). 
200 See supra Part III; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra Part III; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
202 See JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM 3, 12 
(Bantam Books 1993) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.”). 
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practices that produce social benefits should be promoted by copy-
right law203—objectionable.  This follows from a basic consequentialist 
approach, which, at its core, values welfare-enhancing outcomes.  Nor 
can Premise Four be plausibly denied.  Premise Four contends that 
remix culture creates social benefits.204  The truth of this claim has 
been seen in passing throughout the discussion.  Lessig wishes to draw 
the conclusion that “[t]herefore, remix cultural practices should not
be impeded but instead supported by legal rules.”205
I will briefly discuss one type of harm.  The goal here is not to be 
comprehensive in discussing possible harms.  Rather, the goal is to 
show that amateur remix culture is not an unalloyed good such that 
policy issues never arise or that tradeoffs never need to be made re-
garding its regulation.  I, too, sing the praises of remix culture (and 
especially amateur remix culture) in promoting important cultural 
values associated with copyright generally.  Nevertheless, while much 
remix is fair use, not all remix is. 
The clearest type of harm for which I predict that there would be 
a significant degree of consensus is the harm to the exclusive copy-
right that would be possible in a world in which it would be legal, for 
example, to make full-length remixes of newly released feature-length 
films.  In stark contrast to traditional fan fiction, these remixes very 
plausibly could hurt the market for the originals.  Tushnet defines 
“fanworks” as follows: 
[Fanworks] add new characters, stories, or twists to the existing versions.  
They are primarily noncommercial and nonprofit.  And they give credit 
to predecessors and originators, whether implicitly or explicitly.  Rather 
than displacing sales of the original, fanworks encourage and sustain a 
vibrant fan community that helps authorized versions thrive—Harry Pot-
ter, CSI, Star Trek, and other successful works are at the center of enor-
mous creative fandoms containing hundreds of thousands of fanworks.  
These characteristics, in combination, make fanworks fair use.
206
Tushnet’s definition is silent as to whether, under a factor three 
consideration, a fanwork might simply take too much to be a fair use 
or alternatively might harm the market for the original.  I fully agree 
that in general fanworks encourage and sustain a vibrant fan commu-
nity, but her suggestion that fanworks do not “displac[e] sales of the 
203 See supra Part III; see also supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra Part III; see also supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra p. 130 (italics omitted). 
206 Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent, supra note 12, at 503. 
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original”207 implies that she believes that fanworks categorically will 
never harm the market for the original.  Below, I will argue that not 
only is such harm a possibility, it is a likely scenario if we move to a re-
gime of the sort that Lessig proffers. 
It would be possible for Lessig to claim that, on balance, the goals 
of copyright are better promoted in this counterfactual world than in 
the current world in which such uses would not pass the fair use test.  I 
would respectfully disagree and point to the fact that such uses would 
not even be close to passing the traditional fair use test, which pro-
vides an indication of how Congress would weigh the countervailing 
social-welfare considerations.  The larger point is that, however this 
argument comes out on the merits, the stage is not even set until we 
recognize the harm to the exclusive copyright inherent in the policy 
prescription that works such as movie remixes could be widely shared 
due to the legalization of amateur remix.  Thus, we see that while the 
issue is complicated and merits a more comprehensive discussion than 
can be provided here, at first glance, it seems that at least some types 
of significant harm would occur in a world in which amateur remix is 
legal.  But we also saw that this fact exists alongside the fact that remix 
is a great boon to social welfare.  Thus, the task for future work be-
comes one of disentangling the harmful from the beneficial effects of 
remix and promoting or impeding it on this basis. 
Moving on to Argument Five, Premise One contends that there is 
no sensible reason to criminalize remix culture—rather it is the unin-
tended collateral damage of the war that has been fought against file 
sharing.208  Premise Two is implicit and uncontroversial:  a nonsensi-
cal, unjust, and unintended legal result of some other legal goal is un-
justified, leading to the conclusion that therefore, criminalizing remix 
culture is unjustified.209  I agree with Premise One; there is indeed no 
sensible reason to criminalize remix works, at least amateur ones.  I 
would argue that there should be a statutory rule stating that amateur 
remix works are not subject to criminal sanctions. 
Note that on the hegemonic economic account, criminal sanc-
tions cannot be rejected out of hand.  For the utilitarian, everything 
comes down to a weighing of the impact of various policies on social 
welfare.  As has famously been shown in the philosophical literature, 
the utilitarian cannot even rule out punishing innocent people in 
207 Id.
208 See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
209 Id.
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principle if the utility calculation in favor of doing so is compelling.210
In the law and economics literature on punishment, it is axiomatic 
that the level of punishment may vary as a result of such things as the 
likelihood of detection.211  In other words, factors other than whether 
the punishment fits the crime may be dispositive in determining the 
level of punishment.  In theory, this could include criminal sanctions 
for amateur remix. 
Nevertheless, there are good utilitarian reasons why a welfare-
maximizing criminal-punishment regime is likely to produce sanctions 
similar to those that the proportionality principle would produce.  
The more serious the crime, by definition, the more net disutility that 
is created.  Other things equal, the more serious the crime, the 
greater the amount of resources that are justified to deter such behav-
ior.  Thus, setting ancillary causal factors aside, the worse the crime, 
the stronger the sanction.  This is roughly the proportionality princi-
ple, if only in effect. 
The proportionality principle, central to nonconsequentialist 
thinking about criminal punishment, must be applied in the present 
context.  The proportionality principle demands that the punishment
be proportional to the crime.212  In fact, one can colorably argue that 
not only would a criminal sanction be disproportionate to the nature 
of the wrong in a typical remix case (assuming such a case is even a 
wrong at all), it would be extraordinarily disproportionate.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, then, criminal sanctions are seemingly never applied 
in cases involving the putatively infringing actions of remixing ama-
teurs.213  Nevertheless, even the possibility of criminal sanctions in 
such cases is offensive to the proportionality principle.214
210 See MATT MATRAVERS, JUSTICE AND PUNISHMENT 15 (2000) (“[I]n certain cir-
cumstances utilitarianism would determine that the morally obligatory action would be 
to frame and punish an innocent person in order to avoid some greater evil . . . .”). 
211 See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation:  Deceit, Deterrence, 
and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 599-605 (2006) (arguing that the 
government should create penalties for tax evasion that vary inversely with changes in 
the probability of detection). 
212 See SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES 278 (7th ed. 2001) (“The requirement that punishment be proportional to 
the seriousness of the offense has traditionally been a salient principle of punishment.”). 
213 See Ann Bartow, Arresting Technology:  An Essay, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 95, 96 
(2001) (“[One] explanation for a reluctance to take legal action against individual 
noncommercial copyright infringers is a cultural unwillingness directly and linearly to 
equate unauthorized not-for-profit copying with criminal behavior.”). 
214 In addition, I would propose dispensing with statutory damages for amateur 
remix.  This would have the desired consequence of preventing owners from selec-
1926 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1869
The existence of criminal sanctions here is a reflection of the fact 
that copyright infringement and the enforcement of rules against it 
historically have arisen in the context of commercial use.215  When 
commercial pirates are the target of criminal sanctions, these sanc-
tions are more sensible, as the harm is potentially much greater from 
commercial unauthorized use than from amateur uses.216  In addition, 
the primary concern of copyright law has historically been piracy of 
exact copies.  Exact copies present a greater danger of market harm to 
owners because they are much more likely to supersede the originals 
than are works of remix.217  Thus, it is plausible to argue as a matter of 
legal history that criminal sanctions were never intended to be im-
posed upon amateurs.218
tively or randomly wreaking financial havoc on those whose remixing is deemed so 
odious as to be worth stopping.  The question remains, however, whether damages will 
sufficiently deter amateur remix.  Damages are likely to be de minimis, even for genu-
inely objectionable remixes.  Nevertheless, these remixes would still constitute in-
fringement; thus, an injunctive remedy would remain available. 
215 Jessica Litman argues that the public does not believe that the copyright law 
extends to noncommercial use: 
What we know about the general public’s impression of the shape of copyright 
law suggests that the public believes that the copyright statute confers on au-
thors the exclusive right to profit commercially from their copyrighted works, 
but does not reach private or non-commercial conduct.  The law in this coun-
try has never been that simple; the copyright statute has never expressly privi-
leged private or non-commercial use.  Until recently, however, the public’s 
impression was not a bad approximation of the scope of copyright rights 
likely, in practice, to be enforced.  If copyright owners insisted, as sometimes 
they did, that copyright gave them broad rights to control their works in any 
manner and in all forms, the practical costs of enforcing those rights against 
individual consumers dissuaded them from testing their claims in court.
Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right To Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 35 (1994) 
(footnotes omitted). 
216 See Diane L. Kilpatrick-Lee, Criminal Copyright Law:  Preventing a Clear Danger to 
the U.S. Economy or Clearly Preventing the Original Purpose of Copyright Law?, 14 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 87, 91-102 (2005) (describing the history of criminal sanctions in 
copyright law and noting that criminal infringement originally required a commercial 
or financial motive). 
217 But see No Electronic Theft Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-147, sec. 2(b), 
§ 506(a), 111 Stat. 2678, 2678 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006)) 
(amending Title 17 of the United States Code to expand the definition of criminal 
copyright infringement to include either infringement “for purposes of commercial ad-
vantage or private financial gain, or . . . the reproduction or distribution” of copy-
righted works, “including by electronic means” (emphasis added)). 
218 For example, the DMCA imposes criminal sanctions only for willful acts of cir-
cumvention and infringement done for a commercial purpose or for financial gain.  
17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006).  Professors Pamela Samuelson and Suzanne Scotchmer note 
that “commercial purpose” or “financial gain” should be interpreted by courts to ex-
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The above discussion has examined Lessig’s complex set of argu-
ments for the conclusion that amateur remix should be legalized.  We 
saw that the arguments for moving away from the present regulatory 
regime were unconvincing because amateur remix is not criminal.  
Nor will institutions of learning suffer.  Thus, Lessig has not provided 
compelling reasons for moving away from the present regime.  Les-
sig’s rhetorical strategy is very effective because by arguing for legaliza-
tion in the negative, as a better option than the present regime simply 
because it does not suffer from the defects of the present regime, he is 
able to avoid consideration of whether legalization may yield other 
problems.  As our examination has demonstrated, however, there are 
problems with legalization.  In particular, unfair uses would go un-
checked, as we saw in the example of full-length remixes of newly re-
leased films. 
Unfair uses are not frequently discussed, but they deserve more at-
tention because they constitute the other side of the coin in fair use 
doctrine.  The fair use test is routinely discussed in positive terms; it 
has been aptly referred to as a “safety valve” for copyright law.219  And 
while this positive characterization is merited, we must not lose sight 
of the fact that the fair use test is like an optical illusion in which one 
can see a recognizable image both by looking at the black image 
within a white background and by looking at the white area as an im-
age within a black background.  In fair use, we routinely seek to de-
termine which uses are fair against a background of infringement.  
But it is useful to keep in mind that once one accepts that copyright 
protection is valid, and that its justification is to promote creativity, 
then one is committed by logic to the idea that not all uses are fair 
and that unfair uses do not promote the goals of copyright.  A lesson 
to be learned is that we must pay attention to the possibility of signifi-
cant unfair uses of fan fiction and remix culture going forward.  The 
above discussion has demonstrated that there are a number of dy-
namic forces at play that may affect the sorts of fan fiction and remix 
that are likely to be produced in the future. 
The question naturally arises whether there is a way to have one’s 
cake and eat it, too—to have a regulatory environment that promotes 
clude infringement for personal use.  Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The
Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1640 n.309 (2002). 
219 See Tenn. Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 
1970) (describing the fair use doctrine as a “balance wheel and safety valve for the 
copyright system” (quoting John Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act,
53 IOWA L. REV. 832, 832 (1968))). 
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and facilitates remix culture yet does not entirely eliminate the ability 
of fair use doctrine to promote fair uses and to deter unfair ones.  In 
the next and final Part, I will begin to develop such an account. 
V. NORMS AS GENERATORS OF COSTS TO COMMERCIAL OWNERS
As should be apparent from the above discussion, by the term 
“norm” I do not mean a linguistic entity but rather a social practice 
whereby people desire to, feel free to, are incentivized to—or, in the 
case of fan fiction and remix, are often encouraged to—engage in be-
havior or activity of a certain sort.  This Part will highlight and develop 
an important yet underappreciated function of norms that has had 
great significance in the context of fan fiction and remix, especially in 
light of the rejection of Lessig’s statutory solution.  Norms, qua prac-
tices, are a means of creating costs for potentially litigious corporate 
owners of creative content.  One does not typically think of creating 
costs as a good thing, but I will demonstrate that it is beneficial in the 
particular context I describe.  The causal route by which the permis-
sive remix norm set out in Section I.A creates costs is that as more 
people become remixers and implicitly accept the norm that tolerates 
and promotes amateur remix activity, this will directly affect the out-
come of the cost-benefit analysis performed by commercial owners 
when they are deciding whether and to what extent to pursue a strat-
egy of harassing amateur remixers. 
The ability of powerful commercial owners to intimidate fair users 
has been one of the abiding concerns of contemporary copyright 
scholarship.220  As noted earlier, this important concern begins with 
220 See, e.g., Negativland, supra note 15, at 254-55 (“[M]usic owners continue to 
make great efforts to stamp out unauthorized collage in music, even going so far as to 
intimidate and threaten, via the RIAA, any CD pressing plants that manufacture any 
sort of unauthorized found-sound music.  The RIAA acknowledges the existence and 
idea of fair use only in its literature’s footnotes, and hopes it doesn’t spread.”); see also
Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious Copyrights:  Four Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 259, 261 (1994) (“Unfortunately, current practice seems to provide few disin-
centives for the impoverishment of the public domain.  Why shouldn’t a publisher 
claim rights in public domain material?  Why not affix threatening language that will 
intimidate consumers into paying for otherwise fair uses of validly copyrighted material?  
The cost of affixing a copyright notice or threatening language is very low, and the re-
wards can be substantial.”); Cory Tadlock, Copyright Misuses, Fair Use, and Abuse:  How 
Sports and Media Companies Are Overreaching Their Copyright Protections, 7 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 621, 625 (2008) (“[T]he fair use defense has been explicitly in-
corporated into the copyright law as a non-infringing use . . . . [C]opyright warnings 
are unfair because they intimidate consumers into forgoing such legally permitted 
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the observation that amateur fair users are not in a position, practi-
cally speaking, to defend their fair use rights when legally challenged 
simply because of the cost of doing so.  Thus, their formal legal rights 
may amount to nothing in practice; fair users are forced to forestall 
their uses, despite their legality.  Through norm entrepreneurship, 
however, this abiding problem has the potential to be ameliorated to a 
significant extent, at least in the context of fan fiction and remix culture. 
Note that the conclusion that fair use is inadequate in practice 
implicitly relies on a utility comparison (albeit obliquely, given that it 
only looks at one side of the equation):  the harm to meritorious fair 
users who are unable to vindicate their legitimate fair use rights.  This 
begs the question as to the costs on the other side.  These are the costs 
to owners of vindicating their legal rights in those cases in which the 
uses are not fair.221  While costs borne by owners of commercial con-
tent have generally been downplayed, the fact is that such costs are 
real and significant.  This point is strongly argued by Viacom in its 
lawsuit against YouTube.222  The general attitude among commenta-
tors is to dismiss the importance of these costs, because the problem 
faced by commercial owners pales in comparison to the costs that 
owners levy on fair users.  These costs seem of an ilk with the sorts of 
costs that are sometimes an embarrassment for the law and economics 
approach (at least by the lights of non–law and economics scholars).  
The most famous examples of these costs arise in the writing of Rich-
ard Posner, who is candid enough to acknowledge that an implication 
of his approach is that the utility gains to bad actors must be factored 
into the social welfare analysis along with the costs to the victims in 
determining the optimal level of activities such as crime.223  Similarly, 
uses, and because they attempt to withdraw consumers’ rights to make such uses, con-
trary to the Constitution, Congress and public policy.” (footnote omitted)). 
221 Rothman makes an important criticism of the role of custom in determining 
fair use practices.  Her argument is that customs will tend to be biased toward com-
mercial owners due to owners’ power to determine the custom.  See Rothman, supra
note 20, at 1956.  While I agree with this argument as a general matter, I do not think 
that this is the situation with fan fiction and remix.  Rothman does not take proper ac-
count of the powerful role being played by the norm of socially acceptable remix activ-
ity, which is supported by the DMCA provisions that permit users to create and distrib-
ute works in mass numbers. 
222 See Thomas S. Mulligan & Claudia Eller, Viacom Took Months To Build Its Case,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, at C1 (“To lay the groundwork, Viacom hired workers and 
contractors to scour every corner of YouTube’s site at a cost General Counsel Michael 
D. Fricklas put at ‘tens of thousands of dollars a month.’”). 
223 Posner argues that 
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for many commentators, to worry about the costs to rapacious com-
mercial owners has a hollow moral ring to it. 
My point is that instead of being dismissive toward such costs, we 
should focus in on them—with the goal of raising them.  Consider, for 
example, a situation in which the costs of enforcement for some 
commercial owner were to increase materially due to increased pro-
duction of remix or fan fiction by everyday people who draw from this 
owner’s works without authorization.  The addition of these new 
works would have the effect of raising the costs of detecting unauthor-
ized uses of owners’ works and of eliminating those uses from the pub-
lic sphere.224
Notice the virtuous circle that comes with increased participation 
by everyday creators.  There is a direct relationship between the num-
ber of people participating and the costs of stopping such participa-
tion.  The larger the crowd, the easier it is to hide in it to avoid the 
wrath of commercial owners.  This means that the cost to creators de-
creases as the number of creators increases.  While each new person’s 
participation marginally lowers the cost of each other’s participation, 
it marginally raises the cost to commercial owners because of the at-
tendant increase in monitoring costs.  This gives the norm among us-
[i]t might seem, therefore, that before we could pronounce such conduct in-
efficient we would have to compare the offender’s utility with the victim’s dis-
utility.  We could not do this without exceeding the conventional limits of 
economics, which do not allow interpersonal comparisons of utilities, just as 
we could not describe a theft as efficient because the impecunious thief would 
derive greater pleasure from his act than the pain suffered by his wealthy victim.
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 
1197 (1985).  This passage notes the problem of interpersonal comparison of utilities 
but, in doing so, implicitly acknowledges that the malefactor’s utilities are to be 
counted. 
224 Rothman makes precisely this point: 
Another set of litigation-avoidance practices have recently been generated in 
the form of statements of ‘best practices.’  Professors Patricia Aufderheide, Pe-
ter Jaszi, Julie Cohen, William Fisher, William McGeveran, and others have 
recommended the development of ‘best practices’ to help educate gatekeep-
ers and users of copyrighted works about the fair use doctrine and to define 
its scope.  Although these best practices statements suggest that they present 
the ‘best’ possible practices for the use of others’ IP, the statements do not 
purport to set forth the ideal or even a preferable set of rules to govern fair 
uses.  Instead, the statements try to use industry-established guidelines to es-
tablish what are ‘reasonable’ uses of others’ IP in the hopes that these industry 
statements will be adopted by courts when evaluating fair use defenses. 
Rothman, supra note 20, at 1922-23 (footnote omitted). 
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ers the strategic structure of a coordination norm—in particular, one 
possessing a “positive coordination effect.”225
Thus, to the extent that amateur creators and their academic and 
public-interest supporters become active norm entrepreneurs, this will 
have the effect of changing the cost side of the cost-benefit equation 
for commercial owners contemplating the sorts of actions necessary to 
defend their claimed legal rights.  The important point is that, at the 
margin, as the cost of enforcement rises, commercial owners will in-
creasingly conclude that it is not in their economic interest to pursue 
unauthorized users.  Thus, for an ever-expanding domain of unau-
thorized remix works, economic logic will dictate that they remain de 
facto free and fair.  I would contend that this is the main explanation 
for the explosion of unauthorized content available on sites such as 
YouTube:  it is more costly than beneficial for owners to remove the 
content and ensure that it remains unavailable.226
This impact on the cost-benefit calculus and resulting behavior of 
commercial owners is facilitated by the structure of the DMCA.227  The 
notice-and-takedown provisions create a sort of fee-splitting arrange-
ment under which both owners and users are allocated a share of the 
costs of copyright enforcement.  While content owners have com-
plained bitterly about the expense that they must incur in order to 
protect their works from unauthorized use,228 YouTube can plausibly 
claim that Congress contemplated precisely such an arrangement 
when it enacted the DMCA.229
225 See HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 18, at 46-47. 
226 It is not difficult to locate copyrighted content: 
The files are surprisingly easy to find, partly because of efforts by people like 
Mohy Mir, the 23-year-old founder of the Toronto based video streaming site 
SuperNova Tube. The site, run by Mr. Mir and one other employee, allows 
anyone to post a video clip of any length.  As the site has grown more popular, 
SuperNova Tube has become a repository for copyrighted content. 
Stelter & Stone, supra note 32, at A19. 
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3), (g)(1) (2006) (specifying detailed notice require-
ments for content owners attempting to enforce claimed legal rights and eliminating 
liability in most cases for service providers who remove the infringing content after 
notification). 
228 See, e.g., Rosencrance, supra note 81 (quoting Prince’s lawyer as complaining 
about the expense of monitoring for copyright infringement). 
229 See Defendants’ Answer and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07-2103) (“Viacom’s com-
plaint in this action challenges the careful balance established by Congress when it en-
acted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  The DMCA balances the rights of copy-
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This regulatory ecosystem depends on the DMCA’s functioning to 
protect YouTube from the sort of indirect-infringer liability that 
plagued earlier online-creative-content intermediaries such as Nap-
ster, Aimster, and Grokster.230  YouTube appears well built to with-
stand just such an attack.  If YouTube is protected from liability under 
the various safe-harbor provisions of the DMCA, such that the notice-
and-takedown procedure is the main factor determining whether fan 
fiction and remix continue to appear on sites such as YouTube, this 
will create a regulatory framework in which the public can increase 
the power that it has over commercial owners’ behavior over time sim-
ply by expanding the volume of remix activity.231  This activity will alter 
most owners’ cost-benefit calculus such that, in most circumstances, 
owners will conclude that it is not in their interest to pursue legal re-
course against the uses. 
We see, then, that remix culture receives a great deal of support 
from the interaction between the DMCA and both the norm of per-
missible remix as well as its coordination structure.  Consequently, 
remix culture’s maintenance becomes self perpetuating because peo-
ple prefer to take part in fan fiction and remix and will generate a 
prodigious outflow of this creative activity.  The way the DMCA take-
right holders and the need to protect the internet as an important new form of com-
munication.”).
230 David L. McCombs and his coauthors observe that the Viacom litigation has re-
ceived special attention in part because of the possibility that it may provide occasion 
to interpret the DMCA: 
 Google and YouTube have asserted that they are protected by the DMCA’s 
safe harbor provisions, appearing in 17 U.S.C. § 512.  Within § 512, it is the 
third safe harbor, for “information residing on systems or networks at direc-
tion of users” that may apply to YouTube . . . . 
 Additionally, YouTube has been accused of contributory and vicarious in-
fringement, in addition to direct infringement. It has not been established 
whether the DMCA safe harbor applies to indirect infringement. 
 In contrast, the Supreme Court opinion in Grokster dealt directly with indi-
rect infringement.  Although Grokster dealt with cases and copyright issues de-
cided well after the passage of the DMCA, it did not address the DMCA or its 
safe harbors. 
David L. McCombs, Phillip B. Philbin & Jacob G. Hodges, Intellectual Property Law, 61 
SMU L. REV. 907, 936 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
231 Currently, the effect of notice-and-takedown procedures has largely been to 
encourage intermediaries to take down any complained-of material, no matter how 
frivolous the complaint.  See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors 18 
(Stanford Pub. Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 979836, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=979836 (noting that this system is inefficient and often re-
wards overzealous copyright owners, despite its theoretical evenhandedness). 
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down provisions allocate costs creates what is in effect a default rule 
that favors the ability to upload and share remix.  Remix is favored 
because, unless an owner takes positive steps to have disputed content 
removed, the content will remain available on video-sharing sites to be 
streamed at will. 
Yet, because amateur remix is not per se legal, if an owner believes 
that a use is not fair under current legal standards,  the owner can try 
to stop it.  For example, as discussed earlier, it is plausible that re-
mixes of newly released films could partially displace the market for 
the original.  This is the sort of use that one can predict owners will 
deem worth the cost to attempt to stop.  In addition, the role cur-
rently played by the DMCA has the potential to expand.  This will oc-
cur if Lenz becomes precedent.  In this case, the DMCA supports fair 
use doctrine by raising the cost to owners challenging users and hence 
reducing the number of challenges.  This has the natural conse-
quence of making the fair use right more potent.232  Thus, norm en-
trepreneurship and the fair use doctrine under Lenz can work in uni-
son to raise the costs of enforcement for owners, leading to greater 
232 The blanket notification used by Universal in Lenz would likely be inadequate 
in a future case now that owners are on notice.  See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 
F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  The court expressed its doubt that, on its 
understanding of the facts, the defendants would be shown to have acted in bad faith.  
Id.  But suppose that Universal were again to submit a long list of user-generated work 
that in any way used Prince’s music.  Surely a court might find that Universal had not 
learned its lesson that more specific evidence of infringement is in order.  In the past, 
Universal might colorably have argued that it had a good-faith belief that all the uses 
were infringing, based on cases like Air Pirates or Bridgeport, which have been read to 
stand for the proposition that no amount of unauthorized use is too small to serve as 
the basis for a determination of unfair use.  But, according to the view that I defended 
above, this would not be an apt characterization of the current fair use doctrine in 
amateur-remix cases such as Lenz.  Note that fair use plays an important role in the 
normative model that I propose.  It is because much remix is fair use that society would 
be justified in adhering to the permissive-remix norm.  See, e.g., Michael Jude Galvin, 
Note, A Bright Line at Any Cost:  The Sixth Circuit Unjustifiably Weakens the Protection for 
Musical Composition Copyrights in Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 9 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 529, 529 (2007) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit issued its final amended opinion in 
Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, in which it held that any amount of unauthorized 
digital sampling from a sound recording is per se copyright infringement.”); Steven D. 
Kim, Casenote, Taking De Minimis Out of the Mix:  The Sixth Circuit Threatens To Pull the 
Plug on Digital Sampling in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 13 VILL. SPORTS 
& ENT. L.J. 103, 130 (2006) (“Alternatively, the Bridgeport holding could potentially 
eliminate any substantial similarity analysis, which would have significant consequences 
if applied to the actual fair use defense. . . . If the sampling of a sound recording ab-
sent a license is per se infringing, it eliminates the ‘amount and substantiality’ analysis 
which would preclude the defense almost entirely, drastically changing the nature of 
the copyright regime.” (footnote omitted)). 
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access to works in the shared domain as owners at the margin cease to 
actively enforce their claimed rights. 
CONCLUSION
An important and little-appreciated fact is that fair use doctrine 
creates an opening for norms to play a substantial regulatory role in 
copyright law—not in terms of the evolution of its formal doctrine, 
but rather in determining the concrete forms of behavior that come 
within the ambit of fair use.  In the above discussion, we saw the man-
ner in which fan fiction and remix works, both receiving support from 
informal social norms, have come to obtain legal protection by means 
of the fair use doctrine.  We saw that the model under which this is 
occurring, and under which it could occur to a greater degree with 
proper norm entrepreneurship, is not what one might naturally ex-
pect.  It is not that there has been a rash of cases finding fan fiction or 
remix works containing unauthorized content to be fair uses.  Rather, 
due to the manner in which the DMCA allocates costs, much work of 
this nature will de facto be available because the cost-benefit calcula-
tion does not favor owners.  It will still matter, however, that much of 
such work is fair use, particularly after Lenz.  The better the claim of 
fair use, the greater the risk that an owner will successfully be sued for 
misrepresentation, thereby increasing the cost of filing a takedown 
notice.
We saw that fan fiction as a distinct phenomenon makes sense in 
light of its history—it developed earlier and under distinctive condi-
tions that are material to how it should be regulated in order to best 
serve the goals of copyright.  In particular, fan fiction has flourished 
in close-knit communities that foster cooperative behavior.233  This co-
operation has allowed fan-fiction communities to self-regulate.  This 
outcome is important from a policy perspective, as the better the 
group is able to act informally to create effective social norms, the less 
there will be a need for formal solutions. 
This is not to say that informal solutions are necessarily better 
than formal ones—in the abstract, there are good and bad norms and 
there are good and bad legal rules.  However, the particular legal rule 
proposed by Lessig carries attendant costs that may be avoided if in-
formal social norms can instead solve the problem, because informal 
233 See supra text accompanying notes 65-66. 
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norms allow for a desirable flexibility that would be precluded by a 
formal rule change. 
The fan-fiction community has been able to solve an iterated col-
lective action problem in order to minimize the commercialization of 
fan fiction.  To the extent that a noncommercialization norm can be 
maintained for amateur remix, owners of commercial works will be 
less inclined to seek to stop fan fiction.  In turn, there will be less need 
to stop commercial owners from harassing amateur creators.  Specifi-
cally, there will be less need to seek to amend copyright law along the 
lines that Lessig suggests in order to provide for stronger protection 
against harassment for amateur fair-using creators.  In fact, this har-
assment is already being significantly curbed by means of the informal 
social norms that stop amateurs from seeking to commercialize their 
works.
On Lessig’s account, we might have expected to find would-be 
creators of fan fiction and remix deterred from taking part in these 
activities because of fear of criminal sanctions, cease-and-desist letters, 
civil suits for infringement, and the like.  In fact we find the oppo-
site—an explosion of fan fiction, fanworks, and remix culture.  Ordi-
nary people are not being scared away from creating.  Clearly, then, 
there is something bigger going on that must be better understood if 
we are to develop a policy regime that is capable of comprehensively 
accounting for this explosion in amateur creativity, despite the dire 
warnings that its persistence is threatened.  This “something bigger” is 
the role played by social norms.  In particular, we saw that three inter-
connected norms are pivotal to this explosion of amateur creativity.  
These norms support the freedom to create fan fiction and remixes.  
The best explanation of the exploding phenomenon of remix culture, 
then, is not predominantly legal.  Rather, the best explanation of what 
is occurring in this highly significant new area of creative endeavor is 
largely norms driven.  Lessig thinks remixing children are criminals, 
but, as we saw, the kids are all right; they are creating as never before, 
and social norms are an important part of why they are doing so. 
